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“GREAT VARIETY OF RELEVANT CONDITIONS, POLITICAL,
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC”1: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF CONGRESSIONAL DEADLINES ON AMENDMENT
PROPOSALS UNDER ARTICLE V
Danaya C. Wright*
ABSTRACT
Within a year or two, the thirty-eighth state is likely to ratify the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA), setting up an unprecedented constitutional challenge.2 The ERA
was proposed with a seven-year deadline in the resolving clause, establishing the mode
of ratification.3 That was a shift from earlier precedents in which a deadline had been
placed in the text of the amendment proposal itself.4 Article V is annoyingly silent
on the issue of congressional deadlines in amendment proposals, and the Supreme
Court has never addressed the issue of a deadline that could void an otherwise properly
ratified amendment.5 The practice of placing deadlines on amendment proposals began
in 1917 with the Eighteenth Amendment, but has not been consistent since.6 Deadlines
appear to have originated as an effort to torpedo amendments by opponents, but have
since become almost pro forma.7 Some argue deadlines ensure finality and closure;8
1 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453 (1939).
* Clarence J. TeSelle Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law. I
would like to thank Professor Michael Wolf for his comments on this Article. I would also
like to thank Professor Jon Mills and Dean Laura Rosenbury for their support of this re-
search, and especially Winsome McIntosh for her unending devotion to the ERA. I would
also like to thank Adam Bent and Justin Gray for their invaluable research. Despite their
prodigious work, all errors are mine.
2 See Rick Pearson & Bill Lukitsch, Illinois Approves Equal Rights Amendment, 36 Years
After Deadline, CHI. TRIB. (May 31, 2018, 8:45 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news
/local/politics/ct-met-equal-rights-amendment-illinois-20180530-story.html [https://perma.cc
/H6PL-NZSS].
3 Located in “the preamble to the joint resolution authorizing the amendment.” THOMAS
H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42979, THE PROPOSED EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT:
CONTEMPORARY RATIFICATION ISSUES 1 (2013), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531
/metadc462590/ [https://perma.cc/JC6T-E3AC].
4 See id.
5 See id. at 22; cf. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 373 (1921) (holding that a seven-year
ratification deadline did not void the Eighteenth Amendment).
6 NEALE, supra note 3, at 22.
7 See id.
8 See id. at 27.
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others argue they infringe on the power of states to control the ratification process
free of unconstitutional limitations imposed by the national legislature.9
With the 1992 ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment after 203 years,10
and state ratifications of the ERA after 35 years,11 the issue of congressional deadlines
is both front and center and of potentially enormous consequence. This Article exam-
ines the history, theory, and policy of amendment deadlines and argues that they are un-
constitutional limitations on state power, inconsistent with the federalism guarantees of
the founding. This issue will almost certainly require resolution by the Supreme Court,
which needs to give the issue of congressional deadlines its most thoughtful attention.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 22, 2017, and May 30, 2018, Nevada and Illinois respectively became
the thirty-sixth and thirty-seventh states12 to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA).13 Upon ratification by one more state, the requisite thirty-eight states will have
9 See 55 CONG. REC. 5636, 5636 (1917) (statement of Sen. Penrose).
10 NEALE, supra note 3, at Summary.
11 See Pearson & Lukitsch, supra note 2. Nevada ratified the ERA thirty-five years after
the deadline. See Nevada Ratifies Equal Rights Amendment Decades Past Deadline, LAS
VEGAS NOW (Mar. 22, 2017, 3:18 PM), https://www.lasvegasnow.com/news/nevada-ratifies
-equal-rights-amendment-decades-past-deadline/678419418 [https://perma.cc/MX5J-E8HE].
12 Ratification Info State by State, ERA, https://www.equalrightsamendment.org/era-rati
fication-map [https://perma.cc/C86Z-FW26] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
13 Nevada ratified its Senate Joint Resolution 2 on March 22, 2017, with the following
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ratified the proposed amendment and, like the opening of Pandora’s box, a whole host
of legal issues will be unleashed.14 For those of you who thought the amendment was
dead, news of the recent ratifications may seem surprising, but not for the hundreds
whereas clauses, indicating concern with the deadline issue and the State’s belief that the
deadline may be disregarded:
WHEREAS, The 95th Congress of the United States amended the
resolution of the 92nd Congress to extend the time for ratification to
June 30, 1982, thereby indicating its continued support of the amend-
ment; and
WHEREAS, The Congress of the United States adopted the 27th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which was proposed
in 1789 by our First Congress but not ratified by three-fourths of the
States until May 7, 1992, and, on May 18, 1992, certified as the 27th
Amendment; and
WHEREAS, The restricting time limit for ratification of the Equal
Rights Amendment is in the resolving clause and is not part of the amend-
ment which was proposed by Congress and which has already been
ratified by 35 states; and
WHEREAS, Having passed a time extension for the Equal Rights
Amendment on October 20, 1978, Congress demonstrated that a time
limit in a resolving clause may be disregarded if it is not part of the
proposed amendment; and
WHEREAS, The United States Supreme Court in Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 (1939), recognized that Congress is in a unique position
to judge the tenor of the nation, to be aware of the political, social and
economic factors affecting the nation and to be aware of the importance
to the nation of the proposed amendment; and
WHEREAS, If an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
has been proposed by two-thirds of both houses of Congress and rati-
fied by three-fourths of the state legislatures, it is for Congress, under
the principles of Coleman v. Miller, to determine the validity of the state
ratifications occurring after a time limit in the resolving clause, but not
in the amendment itself; and
WHEREAS, The Legislature of the State of Nevada finds that the pro-
posed amendment is meaningful and needed as part of the Constitution
of the United States and that the present political, social and economic
conditions demonstrate that constitutional equality for women and men
continues to be a timely issue in the United States.
S.J. Res. 2, 79th Sess., at 2–3 (Nev. 2017), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/79th
2017/Bill/4912/Text [https://perma.cc/XJ4L-HN8K]; see also Overview, NELIS, https://www
.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/79th2017/Bill/4912/Overview [https://perma.cc/LJV7-Z5DB]
(last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (noting bill became effective March 22, 2017). It also passed in
Illinois on May 30, 2018. See Bill Status of SJRCA0004, ILL. GEN. ASSEMB., http://www.ilga
.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?Doc.Nvm=4&GAID=14&GA=100&DocTypeID=SJRCA
&LegID=99262&SessionID=91 [https://perma.cc/5ARF-HMF2] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
14 See Nevada Ratifies Equal Rights Amendment Decades Past Deadline, supra note 11
(“The amendment required approval from 38 states to take effect.”); Pearson & Lukitsch, supra
note 2 (noting only one more state is needed, but that the deadline in the amendment has passed).
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of women in state legislatures around the country who have introduced the amendment
for ratification every year since its supposed demise in the 1980s.15 The #MeToo
movement, the political divisiveness of the Trump era, and the unprecedented rise
in women’s economic status while they continue to receive only $0.49 to every dol-
lar earned by a man,16 helped unblock hitherto unresponsive state legislatures.17
When the thirty-eighth state ratifies, the courts are likely to be the first stop for
advocates and opponents alike. And the two most contentious issues will be the validity
of the seven-year deadline Congress imposed for ratification of the ERA,18 including
the extension adding an additional thirty-nine months,19 and the legal effectiveness
of the rescissions by five states that had previously ratified.20 If the rescissions are ig-
nored and the deadline is declared unconstitutional, proponents of equality will rejoice
and the ERA will become the Twenty-Eighth Amendment.21 If the rescissions are
deemed to be valid, or the deadline is found to be constitutional, proponents will have
a more difficult battle to win final approval of the ERA.22 Whether there will be
strong opposition is also a looming question.23 Although the ERA proposal is one of
only thirty-three total congressional proposals offered in over 230 years,24 the stakes
are high and the issues raised are unprecedented.25
Many scholars wonder why all the fuss and bother over a stale amendment, espe-
cially since the Supreme Court has already recognized sex as a quasi-suspect classifica-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause worthy of intermediate scrutiny.26 For many,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s tenure on the Court is a testament to the success of
the women’s movement, as she had been a key figure in the movement to ratify the
15 See H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972) (providing that the ERA would
only pass if ratified within seven years).
16 Stephen J. Rose & Heidi I. Hartmann, Still a Man’s Labor Market: The Slowly
Narrowing Gender Wage Gap, 2018 INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. 15.
17 See Nevada Ratifies Equal Rights Amendment Decades Past Deadline, supra note 11;
see also Pearson & Lukitsch, supra note 2 (citing #MeToo as partially responsible for the
resurgence of interest in the ERA).
18 See NEALE, supra note 3, at 22–23.
19 A 1978 joint resolution extended the ratification deadline from March 1979 to June
1982. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment: A Question of Time,
57 TEX. L. REV. 919, 919 (1974).
20 Idaho, Nebraska, Tennessee, Kentucky, and South Dakota rescinded their ratifications.
NEALE, supra note 3, at 9 n.46.
21 See id. at 22–23 (discussing ratification issues of rescission and the 1982 deadline).
22 See id.
23 See Pearson & Lukitsch, supra note 2; see also NEALE, supra note 3, at 26–27.
24 Ethan Trex, 6 Constitutional Amendments that Just Missed the Cut, WEEK (Aug. 28,
2014), https://theweek.com/articles/446233/6-constitutional-amendments-that-just-missed
-cut [https://perma.cc/2KRT-JPR3].
25 NEALE, supra note 3, at 1.
26 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
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ERA and, after its apparent defeat, spent decades providing an alternative jurispru-
dential basis for heightened scrutiny of sex-based classifications to take its place.27
Unquestionably, however, the passage of the ERA would bring about significant
change, besides elevating sex-based classifications to suspect-class status.28 It would
likely render many of the protections against sex discrimination under federal and
state law, like Title VII and Title IX, more enduring and impervious to dilution—or
perhaps even repeal.29 And it would send an important signal that equality continues
to be a valued commitment of our legal system.30
The initial battle on the legality of the ERA is likely to be over the validity of
Congress’s deadline for ratification.31 In light of changed circumstances, the consti-
tutionality of any ratification deadline deserves a fresh, new analysis. Although much
27 Amy Leigh Campbell, Raising the Bar: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU Women’s
Rights Project, 11 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 157, 164–65 (2002); Cary Franklin, Justice Ginsburg’s
Advocacy and the Future of Equal Protection, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 227, 230 (2013).
28 MARY A. DELSMAN, EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT *ERA (*THE EQUAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT) 144 (1975). Of course the Court would not have to recognize sex as
a protected category deserving of the strictest scrutiny as it has done for race, but its failure
to do so would be problematic not just because there would be a separate equality amend-
ment for sex as there is for race, but also because the higher level of scrutiny is seen by many
of the ERA’s supporters in the states as the prime motivation for passage. Other quasi-suspect
categories like illegitimacy would likely remain subject only to intermediate level review
because their protections are not enshrined in the Constitution itself.
29 See id. at 212. Delsman notes that the ERA would equalize the age of majority, the age
of marriage, child labor laws, cutoff date for parental support, juvenile court laws and pro-
cedures, age of buying alcohol, criminal laws, disparate prison sentence laws, legal retirement
ages, obligation for jury duty, sentencing procedures, prison conditions, and state laws restricting
women’s ability to carry out legal transactions. Id. at 156–58. Notably, virtually every one
of these changes have already occurred except some dealing with criminal law and prison
conditions. Certain other laws, like a preference for mothers in infant custody disputes, may need
to be revised, although most states now use individual determinations in cases of divorce,
child custody, alimony, and child support so that there are no default sex-based differences.
ERA opponents were quite concerned about the possible voiding of protectionist legislation
for women in the workplace. Id. at 203–10.
30 For instance, the Missouri ERA Coalition claimed the ERA would
signify a national commitment to eliminate sex discrimination, would, for
the time, give all citizens equal protection of the laws, would recognize
legally that women are persons under our Constitution, would place
woman power and man power on an equal basis of importance, would
emphasize individual dignity and worth regardless of sex, and would
guarantee to each United States citizen his or her fair share of our nation’s
cultural heritage of legal rights.
Id. at 146. Many states ratified the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments after
they had been adopted as a symbolic gesture of their commitment to the doctrine of equality.
See Gabriel J. Chin & Anjali Abraham, Beyond the Supermajority: Post-Adoption Ratification
of the Equality Amendments, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 34 (2008).
31 See NEALE, supra note 3, at 22.
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ink was spilled in the 1970s and 1980s over the subject, the passage in 1992 of the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment after 203 years sheds further light on the relatively recent
practice of adding deadlines to proposals before sending them to the states.32 The
first proposal to be saddled with a deadline was the Eighteenth, a proposal that re-
sponded to the profound social and political upheaval of the prohibition movement and
food shortages during World War I.33 The legislative history of the proposed Eighteenth
Amendment shows great disagreement in Congress as to the constitutionality of im-
posing a time limit.34 Furthermore, despite the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the
limit,35 there continues to be significant doubt as to the constitutionality of the practice.36
This Article explores the history of the amendment process, the imposition of
deadlines for ratification, and the policy implications of the practice. Many constitu-
tional amendments were controversial in their day, and the fact that the ERA, as of
now, is the only one that has timed out means that it is the only one in which a pro-
cedural technicality may thwart what has become an expression of popular will.37
A CBS News Poll in 1999 “reported that 89% of respondents supported the proposed
ERA.”38 Although some continue to be concerned with how sex equality will play out
in the context of the military, public bathrooms, single-sex sports or schools, or other
bona fide occupational criteria,39 the modern LGBTQ movement has shown that these
issues are more often distractions than real obstacles to legal reform on the basis of
32 See id. at 16–18.
33 See id. at 22.
34 See Jean Witter, Extending Ratification Time for the Equal Rights Amendment: Consti-
tutionality of Time Limitations in the Federal Amending Process, 4 WOMEN’S RTS. L.R. 209,
212 (1978).
35 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921).
36 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 925–27; Allison L. Held et. al, The Equal Rights
Amendment: Why the ERA Remains Legally Viable and Properly Before the States, 3 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 113, 113–15 (1997) (arguing that the states control the ratification pro-
cess); Mason Kalfus, Comment, Why Time Limits on the Ratification of Constitutional Amend-
ments Violate Article V, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 437, 437–38 (1999) (arguing the unconstitutionality
of time limits); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional
Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 687 (1993); Witter, supra
note 34, at 217–21.
37 In 1970, 56% of the American public supported the ERA. In 1975, it was 58%. It also
passed the Senate by an 84–8 majority and the House by a 354–24 majority. NEALE, supra
note 3, at 5 & n.21, 7. The D.C. Representation Amendment has also timed out, but currently
is not close to ratification. Proposed in 1978 to give the District of Columbia congressional
representation, only sixteen states have ratified it. See id. at 26. Thus, it is not in the same
posture as the ERA which, presumably, will reach its requisite number of states for ratifi-
cation. Of course, if the ERA is validated and the deadline deemed unconstitutional, the D.C.
Representation Amendment may regain political salience.
38 Id. at 5 n.21.
39 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Pearson &
Lukitsch, supra note 2.
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equality.40 Equal rights have not proven to be as destructive of cultural and social
norms as many opponents predicted.41 After discussing the history of the amendment
process and the imposition of time restrictions, this Article explores the arguments
on both sides of the issue, both legal and policy, and then explores the implications
of a finding that the time limits are, as this Article contends, unconstitutional.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMENDMENT PROCESS AND THE ORIGIN OF TIME LIMITS
Article V of the United States Constitution provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or,
on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the sev-
eral States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be pro-
posed by the Congress.42
The text of Article V is silent as to the question of time limits being imposed on
the states for ratification,43 but the text does clearly identify two roles for Congress.44
First, it can “propose Amendments”45 and, second, it can prescribe the “Mode of Ratifi-
cation.”46 In proposing amendments, Congress clearly has the authority to elucidate
and prescribe the substance of the amendment, e.g., the “right of citizens . . . who are
eighteen . . . or older, to vote shall not be denied,”47 or “[n]o person shall be elected
40 Justice Scalia’s screed, arguing against recognition of sexual orientation protections
in Lawrence, has simply not led to the breakdown of modern civilization as he predicted. 539
U.S. at 589–91, 599, 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). And it is clear that marriage equality has not
led to the destruction or devaluation of heterosexual marriage.
41 Id.
42 U.S. CONST. art. V. There is also a lengthy debate over whether Article V is the exclusive
means for amending the Constitution. See Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending
the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988) (claiming that the people
could call another convention like the Philadelphia one, and propose and vote on additional
amendments). Contra Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and
Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1996) (arguing that Article V is exclusive
without abolishing the Constitution entirely and starting anew).
43 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
44 See id.
45 Id. (emphasis added).
46 Id. (emphasis added).
47 Id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
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to the office of President more than twice.”48 Congress also has the authority to
select the mode of ratification as between the four given options: (1) congressional
proposal and state legislative ratification; (2) congressional proposal and state con-
vention ratification; (3) proposal generated by a convention called for by the states
and state legislative ratification; and (4) proposal generated by a convention called
for by the states and state convention ratification.49 All of the current twenty-seven
amendments have gone through the congressional proposal, and twenty-six have
gone through state legislative ratification.50 Only the Twenty-First Amendment went
through the state convention stage of ratification.51 However, in the past 200 years
there have been hundreds of calls from the states for conventions, yet Congress has
never once acceded to the call.52
These four modes of ratification respond to the Founders’ concerns that the
amendment power lie primarily with the states, but that amendments can be initiated
by both the national legislature and the states whenever either identifies a need.53
The fear that the national legislature would not be responsive to demands of the
states if the public sentiment was to limit federal power was solved by giving the
states the power to demand a constitutional convention.54 It is notable, therefore, that
in all four modes of ratification, the states play the operative role through ratifica-
tion.55 And in the convention mode, Congress need not be in agreement and, in fact,
is powerless to prevent amendments because it has no substantive role other than to
call the convention when petitioned to do so by the states.56
Article V makes no mention of time limits, deadlines, or other procedures that
might be imposed.57 In fact, the Constitution is entirely silent on how state legisla-
tures should ratify, e.g., by simple majority, supermajority, with or without guberna-
torial approval, etc.58 And although much leeway remains with the states to set their
own ratification process, the Supreme Court has held nonlegislative hurdles, like public
referenda within the state, cannot be required.59 One could imagine that if Congress
made a proposal for an amendment, and then required that the amendment be ratified
by popular vote in three-fourths of the states, Congress would have exceeded its Article
V power, which limits the mode of ratification to the four methods mentioned
48 Id. amend. XXII, § 1.
49 See id. art. V.
50 Witter, supra note 34, at 218 n.112.
51 Id.
52 See Paulsen, supra note 36, at 736.
53 See discussion infra Section I.A (discussing the Founders’ original intent).
54 The Virginia Plan explicitly provided for amendments initiated by the states with no
assent of the national legislature necessary. See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
55 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
56 See The FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 593 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
57 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
58 See id.
59 See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 228–29, 231 (1920).
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above.60 However, Congress could presumably propose an amendment to change Arti-
cle V to require a popular vote on all future amendments, but the popular vote amend-
ment would still have to proceed through one of the four prescribed methods.61
In light of the silence on the part of the text, and the Founders’ concerns that
amendment be open from both directions, national and state, the deadline issue is quite
perplexing.62 There is a sound argument, which this Article explores below, that the
act making the amendment legally effective is ratification by the states, and that there-
fore Congress cannot place a condition or limitation on the states’ power to ratify
whenever they feel it is important to do so.63 The passage of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment after 203 years is a testament to the Founders’ understanding that
amendments may occur in the future when public sentiment and experience require
changes to the structure of government or the rights of the people to be protected.64
After all, Article V states that the amendment becomes effective “when ratified” by
the states.65 Senator Brandegee argued that “when ratified” means “whenever rati-
fied” and that Congress is without power to impose any deadlines on the states.66
60 In fact, such an amendment was offered to the proposal for the Nineteenth Amendment
with what appears to have been a clear desire to kill the proposal. See 58 CONG. REC. 77, 93
(1919); see also supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
61 Some commentators think Congress should propose an amendment to require a dead-
line in all future amendments. See Michael C. Hanlon, Note, The Need for a General Time
Limit on Ratification of Proposed Constitutional Amendments, 16 J.L. & POL. 663, 678 (2000).
62 See discussion infra Part III.
63 See discussion infra Part III; see also Robert Hajdu & Bruce E. Rosenblum, Note, The
Process of Constitutional Amendment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 106, 111–12 (1979).
64 Joseph Story noted that sometimes amendments may need time to be carefully con-
sidered and should not be hastily ratified or rejected. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1824 (Bos: Hilliard, Gray, & Co., Cambridge:
Brown, Shattuck & Co. 1833).
65 U.S. CONST. art. V. Professor Lester Orfield agrees that the “constitutionality of Con-
gressional regulation would seem exceedingly doubtful. The states cannot be coerced into
adopting an amendment. . . . Congress has done its work when it proposes [an amendment],
and the matter of adoption is for the states.” LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, THE AMENDING
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 64–65 (1942).
66 55 CONG. REC. 5650 (1917) (statement of Sen. Brandegee) (“The Constitution itself,
therefore, provides that an amendment shall be ratified when approved by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the States; and I think there is no question that that word ‘when’ always has
been interpreted, and is correctly interpreted, as though it were ‘whenever.’ That has been
the practice of the States in connection with all constitutional amendments which have been
adopted.”). He goes on to illustrate precisely the issue of the ERA. Id. (“Suppose the amend-
ment of the Senator from Ohio is added to the joint resolution. I can readily see that when the
matter is taken to the Supreme Court the Supreme Court may hold that Congress, by attempting
to prescribe an unconstitutional condition to the machinery by which the amendment must be
approved by the legislatures of the States, has exceeded its authority, and the whole amend-
ment may fail, although ratified by the States in eight years. For instance, suppose six years
go by and three-fourths of the States have not acted favorably upon this proposed constitutional
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Others, however, have suggested that implicit in Congress’s power to choose the
mode of ratification is the power to impose conditions related to the manner, if not
the substance, of the ratification process.67 They generally base this argument on the
belief that it was not in the Founders’ minds to allow proposals to linger for years,
decades, or even centuries and that some implicit or explicit time limit is reasonable.68
Whether seven years meets that requirement is another matter.69 But the power of
Congress to impose limits can be seen as an example of the general power including
the lesser power.70 Thus, if Congress can make an unlimited proposal, it must include
the power to make a limited proposal.71 In that sense, proponents of the deadline power
treat it like a contract offer.72 If Congress can make an offer to the states for their accep-
tance, it can also limit that offer to being accepted within a prescribed time limit.73
Both of these positions, however, treat the deadline as part of Congress’s power
to dictate the mode of ratification and not as part of its proposal power, although the
first few deadlines were included in the text of the amendment and not in the preamble
identifying the mode of ratification.74 Would there be any constitutional objection
amendment, but that at the end of eight years three-quarters of the States have acted favorably
upon it; the friends of this amendment, of course, I suppose, would then, in order to secure
the amendment, have to turn around and claim that Congress had no authority to attach a
time limit to it, and that it had become a part of the Constitution.”).
67 For instance, Senator Pomerene asserted, “I know of nothing in the Constitution which
says that the Congress can not [sic] attach any condition or qualification to a proposition
which it submits in the form of a proposed amendment to the Constitution.” 55 CONG. REC.
5650 (1917) (statement of Sen. Pomerene).
68 Id.
69 See discussion infra Section II.B.3.
70 Senator Shields argued by analogy from the pardoning power:
The pardoning power is given the Executive by the Constitution of the
United States. It is an absolute grant of that power; but under that grant
the courts have always held that the lesser being embraced in the greater,
the Executive may commute a sentence; he may grant a conditional
pardon. Now, is not this an absolute power for the Congress to submit
to the States the proposed amendment to be ratified? Can it not be coupled
with a condition or a limitation, and come within the principle that the
greater involves the lesser?
55 CONG. REC. 5653 (1917) (statement of Sen. Shields).
71 See id.
72 See Stewart Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, Is the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 200 Years Too
Late?, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 501, 523–26 (1994).
73 Id. at 523. Senator Pomerene argued, “I know of nothing in the Constitution which says
that the Congress can not [sic] attach any condition or qualification to a proposition which
it submits in the form of a proposed amendment to the Constitution.” 55 CONG. REC. 5650
(1917) (statement of Sen. Pomerene).
74 Scott Bomboy, Can a Dormant Proposed Constitutional Amendment Come Back to
Life, CONST. DAILY (May 31, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/can-a-dormant-pro
posed-constitutional-amendment-come-back-to-life [https://perma.cc/S54A-8EPF].
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to Congress proposing an amendment that states, for example, “discrimination on
the basis of sex shall be prohibited if this amendment is ratified by the states within
seven years”? If the deadline is part of the proposal itself, then there would seem to
be no constitutional objection to Congress’s proposal.75 The Constitution does limit
Congress’s proposal power in two respects: it may not propose any amendments before
1808 that would abolish slavery, and it may not propose any amendment that would
deprive a state of equal suffrage in the Senate without that state’s consent.76 But there
is nothing in the text or its history to suggest that a deadline could not be woven into
the fabric of the proposed amendment itself.77
However, making the deadline part of the proposal is logically incoherent and
problematic for a number of reasons. First, until the proposal is ratified, the deadline
has no legal efficacy.78 Once it is ratified, it is arguably irrelevant. This was how the
issue was framed in the congressional debates surrounding the Eighteenth Amend-
ment in which the first deadline was included as part of the proposed amendment.79
Every amendment in which the deadline resides in the text of the proposed amend-
ment has passed within the relevant time limitation.80 Only if the amendment were
to be ratified by the thirty-eighth state after the time limit in the proposal would
there be an issue, but that situation has never arisen.81 But one could imagine that
putting an expiration date within the proposal itself is not inherently unconstitu-
tional, and ratification after the date within the proposal would simply be ineffective
because the proposal would have expired on its own terms.82
75 Daniel Hemel, Some Thoughts on the 28th Amendment, MEDIUM (June 5, 2018), https://
medium.com/whatever-source-derived/some-thoughts-on-the-28th-amendment-fc4d8372
ab14 [https://perma.cc/AX2K-T8LY].
76 U.S. CONST. art. V.
77 See id.
78 Senator Brandegee argued that the deadline is inconsistent with the proposing power
as currently stated:
[I]t is utterly beyond my mental apparatus to comprehend the claim
that, with the Constitution as at present written, with its existing machin-
ery for its own amendment, a proposed amendment which it is sought
to make a part of the Constitution can include a provision which will
so change the Constitution as to make it applicable to the very amendment
which itself can not [sic] take effect until it has been ratified by three-
quarters of the States. It is an attempt to hoist yourself by your own
boot straps, if I may use a homely phrase.
55 CONG. REC. 5651 (1917) (statement of Sen. Brandegee).
79 See discussion infra Section I.B.
80 Bomboy, supra note 74.
81 Just as the ERA raises a case of first impression, the amendment proposing D.C.
representation could raise the issue of a proposal timing out when the deadline is in the text
of the amendment itself. See H.R.J. Res. 554, 95th Cong. (1978) (including the seven-year
deadline in both the amendment and the resolving clause).
82 Dalzell & Beste, supra note 72, at 523.
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But philosophically speaking, it would seem counter to the finely wrought mecha-
nism established in the Constitution for Congress to be able to impose a time limit
on the states within the proposal, when state ratification is the act that gives legal
efficacy to the proposed amendment.83 This would be akin to offering a proposal to
the states that includes a successive Congressional veto power after ratification.84 If
they ratify they presumably accept the condition; if they do not ratify then it is ineffec-
tive. In a sense, either would be no harm, no foul.
Including the limitation within the proposal itself, however, seems inherently
contradictory. If we consider recent Tenth Amendment cases in which the Court has
held that Congress may offer incentives, and regulate on its own through pre-emption,
but may not condition federal benefits on states doing the bidding of the federal gov-
ernment,85 the deadline appears highly suspect. Because approving the amendment
proposal with the deadline is like agreeing to have one’s absolute power limited in
order to obtain the benefits of the proposal, the deadline is like a gun to the head. If
Congress provided two proposals, one with and one without a deadline, and gave the
states their choice, it would be hard to dispute the validity if the states chose the one
with the deadline. And they might very well do so if they want to achieve closure on
a proposal quickly, as they did with the Prohibition Amendment.86 But only giving
83 Kalfus, supra note 36, at 453–56.
84 See id. at 456, 461–62.
85 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 168–69 (1993). In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor explained that the
history of the finely wrought federalism relationship depended on political accountability by
the legislature that is mandating certain acts. She explained:
By contrast, where the Federal Government compels States to regulate,
the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished. If
the citizens of New York, for example, do not consider that making
provision for the disposal of radioactive waste is in their best interest,
they may elect state officials who share their view. That view can always
be pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause if it is contrary to the national
view, but in such a case it is the Federal Government that makes the
decision in full view of the public, and it will be federal officials that
suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to be detrimental or
unpopular. But where the Federal Government directs the States to regu-
late, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval,
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Ac-
countability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected
state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local
electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.
Id.; see also Di Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process—The
Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 639–65 (1985)
(stating the same problem of lack of political accountability); Deborah Jones Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 61–62 (1988).
86 Kalfus, supra note 36, at 465–66.
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them that option is highly problematic, for what state will refuse to ratify because
it thinks Congress has overstepped if the state wants the substantive amendment to
become operative? The deadline puts the states in a catch-22 that seems highly im-
proper in light of the states’ undisputed power over ratification.87 As Senator Brandegee
so eloquently put it, “It is an attempt to hoist yourself by your own bootstraps.”88
There are deeper philosophical issues with the deadline when we further parse the
distinctions between Congress’s proposal power and its mode of ratification power.
Until the Eighteenth Amendment, Congress never imposed a deadline of any sort on
its proposed amendments, but it always used a resolving clause, like a preamble, to indi-
cate the mode of ratification it was adopting.89 Thus, the ERA’s resolving clause reads:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of
each House concurring therein), That the following article is
proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of
the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths
of the several States within seven years from the date of its sub-
mission by the Congress.90
Because the resolving clause is not part of the proposed amendment itself, it is con-
sidered a normal act of legislation, albeit one that does not require presentment to the
President nor, arguably, a supermajority.91 States ratify the proposal and not the
87 In correspondence between James Madison and Alexander Hamilton about the amend-
ing power, Madison noted that conditional ratifications were not acceptable. States could not
impose conditions on their ratifications, like “we ratify but only if x others ratify within the
next two years.” Similarly, Congress should be unable to condition its proposal on ratification
within a certain period. Madison wrote: “The Constitution requires an adoption in toto and
forever. It has been so adopted by the other States. An adoption for a limited time would be
as defective as an adoption of some of the articles only. In short, any condition whatever must
vitiate the ratification.” See Letter from James Madison to Alexander Hamilton (July 20, 1788),
in 2 DAVID K. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY APPLI-
CATION AND CONSTRUCTION 1317 (1910).
88 55 CONG. REC. 5651 (1917) (statement of Sen. Brandegee).
89 Kalfus, supra note 36, at 438–39.
90 H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972). The Seventeenth Amendment was
offered without a deadline and its preamble reads:
Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House
concurring therein), That the following be proposed as a substitute for
section one of Article II of the Constitution of the United States, which
will be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when
ratified by the legislature of three-fourths of the States.
62 H.R.J. Res. 313 (1912).
91 Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 928–30.
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preamble.92 The Twenty-Third, Twenty-Fourth, Twenty-Fifth, and Twenty-Sixth
Amendments all included deadlines in the resolving clause, while the Eighteenth,
Twentieth, Twenty-First, and Twenty-Second included the deadline in the text of the
proposed amendment itself.93 The First through Seventeenth, the Nineteenth, and the
Twenty-Seventh had no deadline.94 And oddly, the 1978 proposed amendment for
D.C. Representation had a deadline in both the proposed amendment and in the
resolving clause.95
Despite lack of any clear legal history on the reasons for the dual deadline, it
would seem that different Congresses took different perspectives on the constitution-
ality of the deadline, whether within the amendment or within the resolving clause.96
Although there is no judicial precedent on the subject, at the very least it would seem
that including the deadline within the proposed amendment would require a two-thirds
majority, and that once included it could not be extended or removed by a subse-
quent Congress unless the deadline was deemed invalid or a new proposal was adopted
and sent to the states.97 The deadline in the resolving clause is a different matter, as
it is simply a form of legislation that can be changed by a subsequent Congress, does
not require a supermajority, and, if valid, presumably could be extended or waived
by a later Congress.98
As with most constitutional questions, the document itself is silent as to the particu-
lar details at issue,99 leaving us to reason from history, precedent, practice, policy,
and logic. Undoubtedly, as Senator Borah argued in 1917, a properly ratified amend-
ment limiting the ratification period for all future amendments would be constitu-
tional.100 And one was proposed in the Senate during the debates on the Eighteenth
Amendment.101 But interposing a time limit either in the text of the proposal itself,
92 See id. at 929–30.
93 Bomboy, supra note 74.
94 See id.
95 See H.R.J. Res. 554, 95th Cong. (1978).
96 It seems the deadline was put into the text to avoid the possibility of later Congresses
modifying or removing the deadline. See discussion infra Section I.B.
97 Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 928–30.
98 This was the issue with the extension to the deadline for the ERA. However, most schol-
ars and Congressmen viewed the deadline in the resolving clause as merely a joint resolution
that does not require a supermajority. See id.
99 U.S. Const. art. V; see also Dalzell & Beste, supra note 72, at 503.
100 55 CONG. REC. 5649 (1917) (statement of Sen. Borah) (“I would vote for an amendment
to change the Constitution of the United States in regard to the machinery provided for the
ratification of proposed amendments, because I think there is much merit in the proposition
that there ought to be a time within which constitutional amendments should be ratified; but
we can not [sic] change the Constitution of the United States as to the machinery by which
ratification takes place by the manner in which we submit a particular constitutional amend-
ment. In other words, we can not [sic] provide in the submission a rule for ratification of that
particular proposal when there is another existing rule in the Constitution.”).
101 See 55 CONG. REC. 5652 (1917).
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under Congress’s proposing power, or in the resolution, under Congress’s mode-of-
ratification power, are both of questionable constitutional validity.102 There are good
arguments on both sides, regarding deadlines either within the proposal itself or within
the resolving clause, which need further clarification and analysis as we approach
the time when a court will most likely have to make a decision on the subject.103 One
of the first places to begin will be founding documents, practices, and policies.
A. Original Intent
There are very few textual references to the amendment process in founding
documents.104 James Madison explained the importance of the amendment process,
for experience and time may show the need for adjustments to the structure of the
national government:
That useful alterations will be suggested by experience, could
not but be foreseen. It was requisite therefore that a mode for
introducing them should be provided. The mode preferred by the
Convention seems to be stamped with every mark of propriety.
It guards equally against that extreme facility which would render
the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty which
might perpetuate its discovered faults. It moreover equally enables
the general and the state governments to originate the amend-
ment of errors as they may be pointed out by the experience on
one side or on the other.105
As David Watson notes, many constitutions of earlier times did not include an amend-
ing power, but drafters of a handful of state constitutions and the federal constitution
apparently recognized that, without a power of amendment, public dissatisfaction
would lead either to revolution or continuation of an unsatisfactory regime.106 The
amendment power was also relied on to garner the support of those who felt that there
were flaws in the federal system being proposed and who threatened to block its rati-
fication if those flaws were not immediately addressed.107
The Virginia Plan had provided that amendments would only originate with the
states and would not require Congressional approval at all.108 And the Report from
102 See Hemel, supra note 75.
103 See id.
104 Kalfus, supra note 36, at 438–40.
105 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 297 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
106 WATSON, supra note 87, at 1301–05.
107 Id.; see also Kurt T. Lash, Rejecting Conventional Wisdom: Federalist Ambivalence
in the Framing and Implementation of Article V, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 197, 209 (1994).
108 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 539 (2016).
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the Committee of Detail passed on that recommendation, proving only one avenue
to amendment—state legislatures call for a convention.109 But Alexander Hamilton
was concerned that states would only tend to their own interests, and not the inter-
ests of the national government, and thus he proposed granting Congress the power
to call for amendments as well.110
The Federalist No. 85 provides the most comprehensive discussion of the
amendment process.111 Its focus is on the power of the states to call for amendments
and the inability of the national legislature to thwart the will of the people.112 As
Alexander Hamilton explained:
In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments it has
been urged, that the persons delegated to the administration of the
national government, will always be disinclined to yield up any
portion of the authority of which they were once possessed. . . . I
think there is no weight in the observation just stated. . . . But
there is yet a further consideration . . . . It is this, that the na-
tional rulers, whenever nine States concur, will have no option
upon the subject. By the fifth article of the plan; the congress
will be obliged . . . to call a convention for proposing amend-
ments . . . . The words of this article are peremptory. The con-
gress “shall call a convention.” Nothing in this particular is left
to the discretion of that body. . . . We may safely rely on the
disposition of the state legislatures to erect barriers against the
encroachments of the national authority.113
James Madison also noted in Federalist No. 39 that the amendment power is neither
“wholly national, nor wholly federal.”114 It is federal because the participation of the
states is required for amendments, but it “partakes of the national character” when
it binds all on the concurrence of less than the whole number of states.115 Unques-
tionably, the primary focus was on the ability of the people, or the states, to rein in
a national legislature through the amendment process when the national legislature
might object.116
There is nothing in the Federalist or Anti-Federalist Papers about a deadline, or any
implied powers in Congress to condition or limit the terms of proposed constitutional
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 56.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 592–93.
114 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 257 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
115 Id.
116 See id.
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amendments.117 And the overall philosophy of a limited federal government means
Congress does not have the power to limit the states without an express grant.118
Moreover, the primary concern of Anti-Federalists was that the amendment power
was too cumbersome, allowing a small minority in a small number of state legisla-
tures to thwart needed change.119 Allowing Congress to impose additional barriers
to state control over ratification would be another sign of national power that would
have upset Anti-Federalists.120 On the other side, there was a desire to make it diffi-
cult enough that the Constitution would not be amended to reflect every shift in political
winds—although arguably the supermajorities accomplished this goal satisfactorily
without adding a debilitating barrier like a deadline.121 The total silence on the issue
of deadlines should be read in light of the ubiquitous concern on the part of the
Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike to protect the power of the states to control
amendments even when the national government might resist.122
Thus, as a matter of original intent, the silence should be read as indicating Con-
gress does not have the power to impose a deadline on a process that lies primarily
with the states. However, original intent often has to give way in light of precedent
and practical necessity. In this case, prior practice also fails to provide a rationale for
validating the deadline.
117 WATSON, supra note 87, at 1311. Madison also indicated that conditional ratifications
were not permissible, which tends to suggest that conditional proposals are equally impermis-
sible. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
118 Although some senators who favored the power to impose a deadline argued it lay
within the Necessary and Proper Clause, one can argue in response that the Necessary and
Proper Clause applies only to Article I powers and not to Article V powers. See Hemel, supra
note 75.
119 Patrick Henry, Speech before the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 7, 1788), reprinted
in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 213–14
(Ralph Ketcham ed., 2003).
120 See id.
121 The amendment process “guards equally against that extreme facility which would
render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty which might perpetuate its
discovered faults.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 105, at 296.
122 See id.; see also Henry, supra note 119, at 213–14. “Madison believed that amend-
ments, ‘if pursued with a proper moderation and in a proper mode, will be not only safe, but
may serve the double purpose of satisfying the minds of well meaning opponents and of
providing additional guards in favor of liberty.’” KLARMAN, supra note 108, at 565. Klarman
further states that:
[i]n terms of how amendments should be pursued, Madison argued that
it would be more “expeditious” and “certain” for Congress to propose
them than for the states to call a second convention to recommend them
(though he conceded that, under Article V of the Constitution, Congress
had no discretion to refuse to call a convention if two-thirds of the states
petitioned for one).
Id.
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B. Prior Practice
As previously noted, Congress proposed all amendments before 1917 with no
time limitations.123 Of the original twelve proposed in 1789, ten passed in under three
years’ time (811 days).124 The Congressional Pay Act amendment, which was one
of the two initially rejected, was eventually ratified as the Twenty-Seventh Amend-
ment in 1992 after 203 years.125 The ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment
after so much time generated a significant amount of scholarship on whether the
amendment had exceeded its shelf life, whether the long shadow of the amendment
affirmed fears of some that proposals once unleashed could never be reined in, but
also supported the general philosophy that the states could amend the Constitution
whenever the public and political will dictated.126 It also brought out calls to amend
the Constitution to mandate deadlines.127 The Eleventh Amendment was ratified in
under a year (340 days) and was the last of the eighteenth century amendments.128
The pace of amendments declined precipitously as only four amendments—the
Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth—were ratified during the nineteenth
century, and all were ratified within three years.129 The Fourteenth Amendment took
the longest, at 757 days, and the Twelfth took the least time, at 189 days.130 None
included a deadline, although the latter three were certainly not uncontroversial.131
Moreover, post-adoption ratifications of the equality amendments (the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth), even a century later, as well as the final stragglers of the Bill
of Rights, have made all of these substantive rights-based amendments unanimously
approved by all states.132 The unanimous ratification of all prior equality and individual
rights based amendments is a sign of the commitment our state representatives have
toward this type of constitutional guarantee.133
123 See NEALE supra note 3, at 22.
124 Notes on the Amendments, U.S. CONST., https://www.usconstitution.net/constamnotes
.html/const.html [https://perma.cc/32L2-ZTPP] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
125 Id.
126 See Paulsen, supra note 36, at 678–81; see also Amar, supra note 42, at 1429–30,
1440–41, 1465–66.
127 See Hanlon, supra note 61, at 665–67.
128 The Eleventh Amendment concerns sovereign immunity of states and was ratified by the
thirteenth state, North Carolina, on February 7, 1795. Notes on the Amendments, supra note 124.
129 Id.
130 The Twelfth Amendment changed the procedure for electing the president and vice
president and was ratified by the thirteenth state, New Hampshire, on June 15, 1804. Id. The
Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery and was ratified by the twenty-seventh state, Georgia,
on December 6, 1865. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment providing individual rights protections
for former slaves, and other matters, was ratified by the twenty-eighth state, South Carolina,
on July 9, 1868. Id. The Fifteenth Amendment, providing voting rights protections, was rati-
fied by the twenty-eighth state, Iowa, on February 3, 1870. Id.
131 See id.
132 Chin & Abraham, supra note 30, at 31–34.
133 Id. at 31, 37–38.
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In the twentieth century, the Sixteenth Amendment on the income tax was pro-
posed without a deadline, and it passed in a little over three-and-a-half years (1,302
days) in 1913.134 The Seventeenth Amendment on the popular election of senators was
ratified a few months later after less than a year of consideration (330 days).135 But
beginning with the prohibition movement, for the first time a deadline of six years
was added by an amendment in the Senate, lengthened to seven years by the House,136
and ultimately became the new norm.137
Debates in the Senate on the imposition of the deadline to the Eighteenth Amend-
ment illustrate both the concern that the Senate was wading into unconstitutional
territory and a recognition that the Prohibition Amendment was unique in interpos-
ing into the Constitution a substantive rule that was more appropriately the subject
of legislation through the police power or the Commerce Clause.138 Senator Warren
G. Harding, of future presidential fame, who introduced the deadline, admitted that
the Prohibition Amendment was a question relating to personal liberty, and he
bemoaned the fact that the only way to submit the issue to the people was through
the amendment process.139 His primary motivation, however, was to get the issue
settled, once and for all, so that Congress could get back to the war effort, and politi-
cians were not “measured by the wet and dry yardstick.”140 Senator Harding admit-
ted that he was not in favor of the Prohibition Amendment and felt the issue was
better left to the states.141 But in the midst of the war and the extremely strong public
sentiment on both sides, he simply wanted the decision over with, and he felt a dead-
line was an appropriate way to assure finality.142
134 The Sixteenth Amendment was ratified by the thirty-sixth state, Delaware, on February 3,
1913. Notes on the Amendments, supra note 124; see also Andrew Glass, States Ratify 16th
Amendment, Feb. 3, 1913, POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2012, 4:30 AM), https://politico.com/story/20
12/02/this-day-in-politics-072387 [https://perma.cc/GF7K-UEZ6].
135 The Seventeenth Amendment was ratified by the thirty-sixth state, Connecticut, on
April 8, 1913. Notes on the Amendments, supra note 124.
136 56 CONG. REC. 421 (1917).
137 Kalfus, supra note 36, at 434 n.12.
138 See, e.g., 55 CONG. REC. 5637 (1917) (statement of Sen. Penrose).
139 See id. at 5648, 5651 (statements of Sen. Harding and Sen. Johnson).
140 Id. at 5648 (statement of Sen. Harding) (“I have watched the progress of this question
from the conflict in the hamlet to the municipality, to the county, the State, and the Nation, and
while I stand here and freely express my doubts about its practicability, at the same time I recog-
nize that it is growing and insistent and persistent and it must be settled. Ever since I have
been in public life in a small way I have seen men continually measured by the wet and dry yard-
stick, and the submission of this amendment is going to measure every candidate for public
office by the wet and dry yardstick until the final settlement. When I say that, I have expressed
my strongest reason for putting a limitation upon the pendency of the amendment. I want to
see this question settled. I want to take it out of the Halls of Congress and refer it to the people
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One can speculate about Senator Harding’s motives. Some of his fellow senators
accused him of adding the deadline in order to guarantee the amendment’s ultimate
failure as, even if it was ratified, many suspected the unconstitutional limitation would
doom the entire amendment.143 At the time, in early fall of 1917, only four proposed
constitutional amendments were outstanding.144 Three of them, including the unratified
two from the original twelve and an 1810 proposal revoking citizenship of people who
accept titles of nobility, were over a century old and there was unlikely any prospect
that they would rise like a phoenix to muddy constitutional norms and procedures.145
The fourth, the Corwin Amendment, was proposed in 1861 to prohibit constitutional
amendments abolishing or interfering with slavery.146 That amendment was ratified by
only two states, and was effectively superseded by the adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment.147 So, it is unlikely that Harding was particularly concerned about stale
proposals rearing their heads, nor was it likely that he was concerned that states
would take too long to ratify the proposed Eighteenth Amendment.148 No amend-
ment to that date had taken longer than three-and-a-half years, and many had passed
in far less time.149
More likely, Harding was hedging his bets, playing both sides, and doing what
he did very well which was trying not to antagonize important political figures. As a
journalist with no legal training, Harding does not seem to have worried much about
the constitutionality of his proposed amendment. As a procedural matter, it would
seem unlikely that Harding was concerned about the amendment process generally
or the prospect of stale amendments suddenly being revived.150 More likely, this was
about the unique controversies swirling around prohibition and, perhaps, was a subtle,
or not-so-subtle, effort to torpedo the amendment.151 Ultimately, Harding voted for
143 Id. at 5650 (statement of Sen. Brandegee) (“[I]n my opinion the attachment of this time-
limit amendment to the proposed prohibition constitutional amendment is extremely liable to
result in the loss of the amendment, and if I wanted by more or less of a trick to secure the defeat
of the amendment I would want no better opportunity to embarrass this proposed constitutional
amendment than to vote for the amendment of the Senator from Ohio.”). This view was also ex-
pressed by Harding’s biographers. FRANCIS RUSSELL, THE SHADOW OF BLOOMING GROVE:
WARREN G. HARDING IN HIS TIMES 299 (1968) (“Privately he hoped, with the wets, that after
half-a-dozen years a third of the states would still be holding out.”); see also ANDREW SINCLAIR,
THE AVAILABLE MAN: THE LIFE BEHIND THE MASKS OF WARREN GAMALIEL HARDING
63–65 (1969).
144 See infra notes 145–46 and accompanying text.
145 See Jol A. Silversmith, The “Missing Thirteenth Amendment”: Constitutional Nonsense
and Titles of Nobility, 8 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 577, 582–83, 588 (1999).
146 12 Stat. 251.
147 See A. Christopher Bryant, Stopping Time: The Pro-Slavery and “Irrevocable” Thirteenth
Amendment, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 512–13, 515 (2003).
148 See 55 CONG. REC. 5648 (1917).
149 See Gregory A. Caldeira, Constitutional Change in America: Dynamics of Ratification
Under Article V, 15 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 29, 35 (1985).
150 See 55 CONG. REC. 5648 (1917).
151 See id. at 5648, 5650.
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the amendment, which suggests that he was probably most concerned with finality.152
However, the uncertainty kept the amendment unstable and worked against his pur-
ported aim of settling the matter once and for all.153 Ultimately, Senator Harding’s
amendment passed by a vote of 56–23, with 17 abstentions, hardly a two-thirds
majority.154 After similar debates in the House, and after lengthening the time from
six to seven years, the amendment proposal passed with the deadline in the text of
the proposal itself with the appropriate supermajority votes.155 The Prohibition
Amendment was ratified in slightly over a year (394 days) so the deadline played
no operative role.156
A year-and-a-half later, the Nineteenth Amendment on women’s suffrage was
proposed with no deadline and was ratified a year-and-a-half later, after 441 days.157
There was no congressional debate on whether the amendment should be time limited
although an amendment to limit the time for ratification was proposed.158 Represen-
tative Clark of Florida proposed a seven-year deadline, but it was voted down with
no debate.159 Representative Saunders of Virginia then proposed an amendment re-
quiring a popular vote in three-fourths of the states.160 It too was voted down with
no discussion.161 Notably both Clark and Saunders voted against the Nineteenth
Amendment, suggesting that they added their amendments with the intent of defeating
the substantive proposal by interposing unconstitutional limitations on the states’
ratification powers.162 Clearly Congressman Saunders’s amendment raised constitu-
tional questions, as Article V requires legislative approval, not popular approval.163 And
Congressman Clark’s deadline amendment tracks closely with the anti-amendment
152 See id. at 5666.
153 See id. at 5661.
154 See id.
155 It passed the Senate on a vote of 65–20, and the House on a vote of 282–128. Scott
Schaeffer, The Legislative Rise and Populist Fall of the Eighteenth Amendment: Chicago and
the Failure of Prohibition, 26 J.L. & POL. 385, 394, 396 (2001). Because the House changed
the length of the deadline, the resolution had to go back to the Senate, which passed it on a
vote of 47–8. Id. at 396.
156 The thirty-sixth state, Nebraska, ratified it on January 16, 1919. Ten more states quickly
followed suit, resulting in a total of forty-six states to ratify the amendment out of forty-eight.
Id. at 397.
157 Lynda G. Dodd, Parades, Pickets, and Prison: Alice Paul and the Virtues of Unruly Con-
stitutional Citizenship, 24 J.L. & POL. 339, 424 (2008).
158 Although a proposed amendment was offered to add a deadline, the amendment to the
proposal was voted down with no discussion. See 58 CONG. REC. 93 (1919).
159 Only 37 Congressmen voted to add the deadline, and 259 opposed it, while 52 voted to
add the public vote requirement and 244 opposed it. See id. at 81, 93.
160 Id. at 87.
161 See id. at 93.
162 See id. at 93–94.
163 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 231 (1920) (holding that states could not require popular
approval in addition to legislative approval under Article V).
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tactics of Senator Harding regarding the Eighteenth Amendment.164 These initial
efforts involving the deadline suggest that a time limit was imposed with an under-
standing that it was an unconstitutional limitation and could result in either voiding
the amendment altogether if it did receive the requisite ratifications, or causing it to
be timed out if it failed within the requisite time.165 Either way it was a win-win for
the amendment opponents.
In 1921, however, the Supreme Court upheld the Eighteenth Amendment as valid
in Dillon v. Gloss, despite the existence of the ultimately inoperative deadline.166 As
I discuss below, the case was unusual and does not provide particularly helpful prece-
dent as the petitioners sought to have the entire amendment voided as a result of the
purportedly unconstitutional deadline.167 When the Court upheld the amendment
despite the deadline, the stakes ultimately shifted as amendment opponents could not
use the mere presence of a deadline to torpedo proposals.168 After 1921, therefore,
discussion over the deadline shifted to proponents of the amendment adding it pur-
portedly to achieve finality and closure as legislators were concerned that proposals,
once unleashed, could not be reclaimed.169
A few years later, in 1924, a child labor amendment was proposed, again with
no deadline, although the proposal ultimately was not ratified.170 The need for the
amendment became moot, however, with the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Darby in 1941, affirming the child labor prohibitions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.171
A decade later, the Twentieth Amendment, changing the commencement of
terms for Congress and the President, was ratified in under a year (327 days) with
164 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. It would be two years before the Supreme
Court would clarify, in Dillon v. Gloss, that the textual deadline does not render the amendment
unconstitutional. See 256 U.S. 368, 374 (1921).
165 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
166 256 U.S. 368, 374 (1921).
167 See id. at 370–71.
168 See id. at 375–76.
169 See id.
170 Thirty-six states needed to ratify the Child Labor Amendment, but only twenty-eight
states did. Dina Mishra, Child Labor as Involuntary Servitude: The Failure of Congress to
Legislate Against Child Labor Pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment in the Early Twentieth
Century, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 59, 91 (2010). Ironically, this unratified amendment may be the
impetus for the imposition of future deadlines, as only five states had ratified within three
years of its being proposed. See Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change:
Rethinking The Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 426 (1983). The majority of states
(fourteen) ratified in 1933, nine years after it was proposed, and another eight states ratified
in 1935 or 1937, the latest being thirteen years after it was proposed by Congress. See id. It
is not coincidental that ratifications ceased in 1937 when the Supreme Court began its retreat
from the strong economic substantive due process jurisprudence that had characterized the
Lochner era. See Michael J. Phillips, The Progressiveness of the Lochner Court, 75 DENV.
U.L. REV. 453, 457 (1998).
171 312 U.S. 100, 100–01 (1941).
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a deadline in the text of the amendment proposal itself.172 The Twentieth Amend-
ment proposal was the first successful amendment in which Congress had the benefit
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dillon v. Gloss.173 Discussion on the deadline in
the Twentieth Amendment noted the precedent of Dillon, and also claimed the need
for finality.174 Senators and Representatives were concerned that proposals might hang
out for decades or even centuries, only to be ratified on the sly by states at their con-
venience.175 Since the Twentieth Amendment, the deadline has essentially become
pro forma with no further judicial pronouncements on the matter.176
The Twenty-First and Twenty-Second Amendments were subsequently ratified
in 1933 and 1951 respectively, both containing deadlines in the text of the proposals
themselves.177 The Twenty-Second Amendment, limiting presidential terms to two,
took three weeks shy of four years for ratification (1,439 days) and was the longest
of any twentieth century amendment to be ratified.178
The Twenty-Third Amendment marked another change, however, when Congress
began to include the deadline in the resolving clause rather than in the text of the
amendment itself.179 The practice had actually begun five years earlier when Professor
Noel Dowling of Columbia Law School testified to the Senate Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Rights that Congress should not clutter up amendments by including the
deadline in the text.180 Instead, they should move it to the resolving clause.181 The
subcommittee was considering an amendment on the procedure for governors to fill
vacancies in the Congress caused by disasters.182 The subcommittee changed the
location of the deadline and explained its reasons during the Senate debate.183 And
although that proposal never received the requisite votes to be sent to the states,184
172 The Twentieth Amendment was ratified by the thirty-sixth state, Missouri, on January 23,
1933. John Copeland Nagle, Lame Duck Logic, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1177, 181 & n.12 (2012).
173 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
174 75 CONG. REC. 3822 (1932).
175 See, e.g., id.
176 NEALE, supra note 3, at 22.
177 The Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment and was ratified by
the thirty-sixth state, Utah, on December 5, 1933. Jonathan M. Rotter & Joshua S. Stambaugh,
What’s Left of the Twenty-First Amendment?, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 601, 624
(2008). The Twenty-Second Amendment limited the president to two terms and was ratified by
the thirty-sixth state, Minnesota, on February 27, 1951. Julia C. Wommack, Congressional
Reform: Can Term Limitations Close the Door on Political Careerism?, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J.
1361, 1379–80 (1993).
178 Excepting, of course, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, that was ratified in 1992 after
203 years. See Paulsen, supra note 36, at 679.
179 See Witter, supra note 34, at 211.
180 See id. at 214.
181 See id.
182 Appointment of Representatives: Hearing on S.J. Res. 8 Before the Subcomm. of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 1, 34 (1955).
183 See 101 CONG. REC. 6628 (1955).
184 84 S.J. Res. 8 (1955–1956), PROQUEST CONG., https://congressional-proquest-com
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the shift from the text to the resolving clause became standard after that.185 The Twenty-
Third, Twenty-Fourth, Twenty-Fifth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments all included
deadlines in the resolving clause, though none took more than two years for ratifica-
tion.186 All four were proposed prior to the ERA (in 1960, 1962, 1965, and 1971,
respectively) with no discussion of the deadline.187 The ERA, following the rela-
tively recent fifteen-year trend, included the deadline in the resolving clause and was
ultimately the first proposal to be timed out as a result of the deadline.188 As discussed
below, however, the addition of the deadline was not without controversy.189
Six years later, however, the proposal for D.C. representation included a deadline
in both the text of the amendment and the resolving clause and it too has timed out
if either type of deadline is deemed constitutional.190 Debate around the D.C. Repre-
sentation Amendment suggests that there was concern about the effectiveness of the
deadline in the resolving clause.191 The proposal originally included the deadline in
the resolving clause, as the prior five proposals had done.192 In committee, however,
an amendment was offered to include a deadline in the text of the amendment pro-
posal itself on the grounds that the textual deadline would not be subject to revision,
waiver, or extension by a subsequent Congress.193 This concern arose because of the
debate swirling around the ERA, as it was getting close to ratification but running
short of time and there was talk of an extension.194 Members of the Judiciary
Committee of the House apparently believed that a deadline in the resolving clause
was malleable, where a deadline in the text itself was not.195
.proxy.wm.edu/Congressional/docview/+03.204.84_sjres_8?accountid=15053 [https://perma
.cc/K3VL-K8P9] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
185 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
186 The Twenty-Third Amendment, granting the District of Columbia the right to vote for
president, was ratified by the thirty-eighth state, Ohio, on March 29, 1961. Beverly J. Ross &
William Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 12 J.L. & POL. 665, 681 (1996).
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, abolishing poll taxes, was ratified by the thirty-eighth state,
South Dakota, on January 23, 1964. Jason P.W. Halperin, Note, A Winner at the Polls: A Pro-
posal for Mandatory Voter Registration, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 87 n.121 (1999).
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, dealing with the presidential succession, was ratified by the
thirty-eighth state, Nevada, on February 10, 1967. John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amend-
ment: An Explanation and Defense, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 481, 481 (1995). The Twenty-
Sixth Amendment, granting eighteen-year-olds the right to vote, was ratified by the thirty-eighth
state, North Carolina, on July 1, 1971. Jenny Diamond Cheng, Voting Rights for Millennials:
Breathing New Life into the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 67 SYRACUSE L. REV. 653, 672 (2017).
187 Witter, supra note 34, at 214.
188 See id. at 210.
189 See discussion infra Part II.
190 See H.R.J. Res. 554, 95th Cong. (1978).
191 See 124 CONG. REC. 5263–65 (1978).
192 See id. at 5263–64.
193 Id. at 5269.
194 See id. at 5268.
195 See id. at 5264.
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As things currently stand, six proposals for constitutional amendments have
failed of ratification.196 The apportionment and titles of nobility proposals of 1789
and 1810 contain no deadlines but have lost their salience for all practical purposes.197
The Corwin Amendment of 1861, prohibiting amendments to outlaw slavery, has
been essentially foreclosed by the Thirteenth Amendment.198 And the Child Labor
Amendment of 1924 has been mooted.199 Although it is certainly possible that any
of these four amendments could be revived, just as the Congressional Pay Amend-
ment was,200 and any of them could be passed decades or even centuries later.201 The
ERA and the D.C. Representation Amendments have both timed out and are there-
fore susceptible to being revived if the deadlines are deemed to be ineffective.202 The
fact that the D.C. Representation Amendment includes a deadline in the text while
the ERA includes it only in the resolving clause may be relevant in a constitutional
challenge.203 If deadlines generally are unconstitutional, it would not matter. If, how-
ever, deadlines in the text are deemed constitutional and unalterable, the D.C. Represen-
tation proposal may be dead,204 but not the ERA as its deadline in the resolving
clause could be subject to extension or waiver by a subsequent Congress.205
Prior practice tells us very little, except that Congress has not been consistent
in the practice of adding deadlines, and that there has been substantial debate over
the constitutionality of any deadline.206 There is also uncertainty as to the constitu-
tionality of the deadline in the amendment itself as opposed to in the resolving clause,
an issue on which the Supreme Court has made its one and only contribution to set-
tling the question.207
C. Judicial Precedent
As predicted by Senators Borah and Cummins in 1917, the Eighteenth Amend-
ment was challenged on the basis of the deadline inserted in the amendment itself.208
196 Jonathan L. Marshfield, Decentralizing the Amendment Power, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 963, 1008 (2015).
197 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
198 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
199 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
200 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
201 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 188, 190 and accompanying text.
203 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
205 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
206 See discussion supra Section I.B.
207 See discussion infra Part II.
208 55 CONG. REC. 5652 (1917) (statement of Sen. Cummins) (“I have no doubt whatever
that if ratifications were to occur after the period of six years named in the amendment of the
Senator from Ohio the courts would either recognize those ratifications or set aside the entire
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Dillon v. Gloss challenged the National Prohibition Act promulgated under authority
of the Eighteenth Amendment on grounds that it was invalid simply because it con-
tained the seven-year deadline, even though it was fully ratified within the requisite
seven years.209 In upholding Congress’s power to impose the deadline in the text of
the amendment, Justice VanDevanter noted that:
[t]he plain meaning of . . . [Article V] is (a) that all amendments
must have the sanction of the people of the United States, the
original fountain of power, acting through representative assem-
blies, and (b) that ratification by these assemblies in three-
fourths of the States shall be taken as a decisive expression of
the people’s will and be binding on all.210
The Eighteenth Amendment was properly ratified by the states, so seeking voidance
of the amendment on the technicality that a deadline was included that never became
operative was an audacious argument.211
Because the argument was that the amendment was void simply because of the
existence of a deadline, the justices had to address the deadline issue itself even
though the deadline had not played any operative role.212 Noting that the finely
wrought procedure had been successfully completed, Justice VanDevanter explained
that Congressional proposal and state ratification are succeeding steps in a single
process in which, he asserted, “the natural inference being that they are not to be
widely separated in time.”213 Finding the deadline to be a “subsidiary matter[ ] of
detail” that “Congress may determine as an incident of its power to designate the
mode of ratification,” the Court upheld the irrelevant seven-year deadline as reason-
able.214 The Court did not expressly acknowledge the inconsistency inherent in its
decision.215 Justice VanDevanter opined that the deadline was a matter of detail that
was within Congress’s mode of ratification power, yet the deadline at issue was
located within the proposal itself and not in the resolving clause that actually stated
the mode of ratification.216
The arguments in the Dillon briefs underscore the ambiguity of the complex
issues: that the deadline was imposed to torpedo the amendment, that it is likely
amendment, and the possible outcome of adopting the amendment of the Senator from Ohio
will be to plunge the whole subject into litigation that may continue for years to come.”).
209 256 U.S. 368, 370–71 (1921).
210 Id. at 374.
211 Id. at 376–77.
212 Id. at 373.
213 Id. at 375.
214 Id. at 376.
215 Id. at 375–76.
216 Id. at 371–74.
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unconstitutional, and also that it was irrelevant. The appellant argued primarily that
the entire Eighteenth Amendment should be tossed out because there was sufficient
legislative history to suggest that the requisite two-thirds vote by both houses was
acquired only because of the presence of the deadline.217 That was the main argu-
ment of appellant and immediately exposes the weakness of the case. Although
numerous senators and representatives may have indicated that they were voting in
favor of the amendment solely because of the deadline, there was no way to know
that the proposal would have failed had the deadline not been included. The appellant
argued that the deadline was a condition of approval and that without the deadline
the two-thirds majority would not have been reached.218 And even if it might have
been reached, the existence of the unconstitutional limitation rendered the vote sus-
pect. Both of these were easy targets for the respondent, who simply answered that
it was unimportant whether the deadline was constitutional or not since the amend-
ment passed and, if it wasn’t constitutional, it could be excised without destroying
sections one and two of the amendment.219
Arguably asking the Court to void the entire Eighteenth Amendment because of
the unconstitutional deadline was a long shot but the appellant had no lesser argu-
ment to fall back on and would only prevail if the entire amendment were thrown out.
Voiding only section three would leave intact the substance of the amendment under
which he was convicted. This meant the appellant had to argue the entire amendment
was infected, which was difficult to do given that it received its requisite two-thirds
votes in both houses and was ratified by the states within thirteen months. The ap-
pellant did make the somewhat persuasive argument that the speed of ratification is
evidence that the states felt under the gun and that they were unable to engage in
proper deliberation.220 The fact that they could have taken another nearly six years
to deliberate undermined the strength of that argument.
Dillon, however, essentially answered only one of a multitude of questions posed
by the deadline issue.221 In the congressional debates on the Eighteenth Amendment,
there were three possible scenarios raised.222 First, the deadline might be deemed an
unconstitutional limitation on the states and thus the entire amendment would be
held void because it contained this unconstitutional condition, even if it otherwise
was ratified successfully within the time allotted.223 That was the appellant’s posi-
tion.224 Second, the deadline could be deemed unconstitutional or ineffective, but the
substance of the properly ratified amendment could continue to stand as the section
217 Brief for Appellant at 5–8, Dillon v. Gloss 256 U.S. 368 (1921) (No. 251).
218 Id. at 9–10.
219 Brief for Appellee at 6–7, Dillon v. Gloss 256 U.S. 368 (1921) (No. 251).
220 Brief for Appellant, supra note 217, at 11.
221 Id. at 371.
222 55 CONG. REC. 5648–53 (1917).
223 Id. at 5649.
224 Id.
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containing the deadline would be severed.225 Third, the deadline could be affirmed as
a permissible exercise of Congress’s power.226 If deemed permissible, however, there
are at least two different theories of its legality.227 A narrow reading of Congress’s
actions would allow the deadline to stand in this particular amendment because it
was irrelevant—the proposal was ratified within the time limit.228 A broader reading
of Congress’s actions would hold that Congress may impose any deadline that could
be effective to time out a proposal because imposing a deadline is fully within
Congress’s proposal power or mode of ratification power.229
Dillon ultimately only involved the first scenario by holding that the deadline
within the text did not, ab initio, void the proposed amendment altogether, especially
in light of ratification within the given time period.230 What Dillon did not answer
is whether the deadline is actually legally permissible to disqualify an amendment
that was ratified after the deadline had expired.231 Because the Eighteenth Amend-
ment was fully ratified by the requisite number of states within a very short time, the
only question for the Court in Dillon was whether the presence of the deadline in
what was otherwise a fully compliant amendment process was sufficient to void the
amendment altogether.232
The Court’s decision in Dillon effectively stifled the complaints of senators like
Borah and Cummins,233 who had argued against the addition of the deadline on the
grounds that it would render the entire amendment unconstitutional.234 Because the
deadline was not violated, there was no real issue raised about the power of Congress
to limit the states’ period of ratification.235 The Dillon Court expressed in dictum that
Congress could impose reasonable time limits, but that dictum is premised on the
theory that proposal and ratification are succeeding steps in a single endeavor.236 The
bogeyman of a proposal hanging out for all time, or that ratification in some states
may be separated from that in others by many years, has in fact now occurred and
has not proven to be so problematic.237 Dillon was decided seventy years before the
passage of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, and that recent development calls into
225 Id. at 5652–53.
226 Id. at 5651.
227 Id. at 5650–51.
228 Id. at 5650.
229 Id. at 5651.
230 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376–77 (1921).
231 See id. at 371 (noting that Article V is silent as to how long proposed amendments re-
main valid).
232 Id. at 370–71.
233 Id. at 375–76.
234 55 CONG. REC. 5649–53 (1917).
235 Dillon, 256 U.S. at 376–77.
236 Id. at 373, 376.
237 Id. at 371, 373 (referencing the debates of the Eighteenth Amendment and noting that
Article V does not establish a time limit for proposed amendments).
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question the Dillon Court’s reasoning that a reasonable time limit is implicit in all
proposed amendments.238
The most one can say of Dillon is that the Court refused to void a legally ratified
amendment simply because a condition was imposed that never became operative.239
The ERA poses a completely different question because the deadline could be deemed
operative to thwart the wishes of three-fourths of the states that ultimately vote to
ratify the proposal.240 Now that the deadline could be a matter of legal relevance,
Justice VanDevanter’s acknowledgment that amendments must have the sanction
of the people, and that legislative ratification is a decisive expression of the people’s
will, makes problematic Congress’s imposition of an artificial roadblock to the ex-
pression of that will.241 The second difference is that the deadline in the ERA is in
the resolving clause and not in the amendment itself.242 To that end, Dillon could be
seen as completely irrelevant because it affirmed the power of Congress to include the
condition within the proposal but says nothing about the power of Congress to in-
clude the limitation in the resolving clause, including whether a subsequent Congress
may modify the deadline.243 Moreover, most congressional scholars view Dillon as
a relatively weak and poorly reasoned precedent.244
Because the Court did not need to address the question of whether a deadline,
in either the resolving clause or the text, could operate to void an otherwise properly
ratified amendment, the dictum in Dillon is not very persuasive.245 It is one thing to
hold that an ineffective technicality will not void an otherwise proper law; it is
another to hold that technicality to be effective to thwart the will of a supermajority
of the people.246
The Court has never again weighed in on the constitutionality of a Congressional
deadline on an amendment proposal. And, if the ERA gets the thirty-eighth state’s
ratification, the deadline will become an obstacle to the expression of the people’s
will.247 That means there are four possible outcomes: (1) the Court could hold the
238 Id. at 375.
239 See generally id.
240 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
241 Dillon, 256 U.S. at 374.
242 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
243 See Dillon, 256 U.S. at 370–71, 375–77.
244 Memorandum Opinion to C. Boyden Gray, Couns. to the President, 16 Op. O.L.C. 85,
97 (1992) [hereinafter O.L.C. Memorandum] (“In sum, the dictum of Dillon and the view of
Chief Justice Hughes’s plurality in Coleman are not authoritative nor are they persuasive.”);
Hanlon, supra note 61, at 671–76; Paulsen, supra note 36, at 689–96; see also Kalfus, supra
note 36, at 451–53.
245 See Dillon, 256 U.S. at 370–71 (noting that the issue before the Court was whether the
time limit, on its own, invalidated the amendment).
246 See id. at 370–71, 374 (noting that amendments’ primary purpose are to serve the will
of the people).
247 See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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deadline to be valid and unwaivable, thus requiring proponents of the ERA to start all
over again; (2) the Court could hold the deadline to be valid but waivable by Congress,
which could arguably be amended through a simple majoritarian joint resolution to
amend the resolving clause;248 (3) the Court could hold that deadlines in the resolving
clause are ineffective because they are in the preamble and are not part of the opera-
tive language; and (4) the Court could hold that all deadlines, whether in the resolving
clause or the amendment itself, are unconstitutional restrictions on the power of the
states to ratify amendments when the political, social, and economic conditions so
dictate, effectively distinguishing Dillon in light of the precedent of the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment. Under either the third or fourth outcome, a finding that the
deadline is ineffective would presumably have no effect on the substance of the
proposed amendment, as the deadline would be merely severed and held to be of no
effect.249 And under both there would be no scope for further Congressional action.
In 1939, the Court addressed the issue of whether a state could ratify a proposal
after rejecting it in Coleman v. Miller.250 In that case, Kansas had initially rejected
the proposed Child Labor Amendment, and then later ratified it through a tied legisla-
tive vote, broken by the Lieutenant Governor thirteen years after it was initially pro-
posed.251 Opponents of the amendment brought suit, claiming that the proposal had
lost its vitality because of the passage of so much time, that a state could not ratify
after it had rejected a proposal, and that the Court had jurisdiction to hear the case
and order mandamus to prevent the transmission of the notice of ratification to the
Secretary of State.252 Because there were so many convoluted issues, the justices
split along a variety of axes and it issued four different opinions.253 For our purposes,
however, the important holding is that constitutional amendments do not contain
implicit time limits.254 The Child Labor Amendment did not contain any deadline
and the Court refused to impose one, stating that it was up to Congress to determine
whether the political, social, or economic conditions of the time had so changed as
to render the proposal stale.255
248 This was the argument of many in 1979 when the original seven-year deadline was reach-
ing an end with only thirty-five states having ratified. The extension of thirty-nine months
was deemed by many to be a legitimate act of Congress in modifying the deadline since it was
in the resolving clause. Others, however, felt that it was unconstitutional. See Witter, supra
note 34, at 219–23.
249 This is what happens when a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional; the rest
remains valid. Such an effect would comply with Dillon.
250 307 U.S. 433, 435–36 (1939).
251 Id. at 435–37.
252 Id. at 436.
253 Id. at 436–56; id. at 456–60 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 460–70 (opinion of Frankfurter,
J.); id. at 470–74 (Butler, J., dissenting).
254 Id. at 456 (Black, J., concurring).
255 The Supreme Court states:
When a proposed amendment springs from a conception of economic
needs, it would be necessary, in determining whether a reasonable time
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The holding in Coleman could be read to grant Congress unfettered discretion
to determine a time limit for a proposed amendment, as the determination of whether
it is stale or not was held to be a political question.256 It could also be read, in light
of precedents around rescissions and post-rejection ratifications of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as granting Congress the sole power to determine whether a state has
ratified or not.257 The latter interpretation focuses solely on the question of whether
states can take a second bite at the apple, so to speak, before an amendment has been
fully ratified by the requisite number of states.258 The first suggests that the courts
will take a broad, hands-off approach to details around ratification under the Politi-
cal Question Doctrine.259 But because no opinion in Coleman received a majority,
to a large extent they are all dicta.260
Numerous scholars have argued that judicial review of the deadline issue should
not be deemed a political question under Coleman, and their arguments are persua-
sive.261 The political question in Coleman was Congress’s power to accept a state’s
notice of ratification, not whether Congress is exempt from judicial oversight in all
matters regarding Article V amendments.262 Because the deadline is a straightfor-
ward question of interpretation of powers granted to Congress by Article V, judicial
resolution does not raise any of the concerns articulated in Baker v. Carr, the Court’s
most extensive discussion of the Political Question Doctrine, in the way Congress’s
decision to accept or reject a state’s purported ratification does.263
had elapsed since its submission, to consider the economic conditions
prevailing in the country, whether these had so far changed since the sub-
mission as to make the proposal no longer responsive to the conception
which inspired it or whether conditions were such as to intensify the
feeling of need and the appropriateness of the proposed remedial action.
In short, the question of a reasonable time in many cases would in-
volve, as in this case it does involve, an appraisal of a great variety of
relevant conditions, political, social and economic, which can hardly be
said to be within the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court
of justice . . . .
Id. at 453 (majority opinion).
256 See Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 548 (1992).
257 This was a controversial issue during ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
id. at 547–48; Douglas H. Bryant, Commentary, Unorthodox and Paradox: Revisiting the
Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 555, 575–76 (2002); Thomas B.
Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
1627, 1628–31 (2013).
258 See Bernstein, supra note 256, at 547–48.
259 Id. at 548.
260 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
261 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 36, at 706–18.
262 Id. at 707–12.
263 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
76 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:45
Moreover, the Political Question Doctrine is one of separation of powers (i.e.,
whether a judicial determination steps on the toes of either the legislative or executive
branch).264 The issue of the constitutionality of a deadline on state ratification, how-
ever, is a federalism question (i.e., whether Congress can limit the states in the exercise
of their constitutional right to ratify amendments).265 Although it is easy to confuse
the two doctrines, the plurality in Coleman held that it was Congress’s and not the
courts’ job to determine whether ratification had in fact occurred.266 Subsumed in
that was a discussion of whether Congress could choose to reject a ratification if too
long a time had elapsed.267 It would seem that the passage of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment puts that issue to rest, leaving us with very little guidance on how to
view Congress’s power to impose conditions on the states.268
There are a number of technical details left unstated by Article V. Whether states
can ratify after rejection or rescind after ratification is one.269 Another is whether
Congress may impose any deadlines or other conditions on ratification.270 A third
is whether Congress, the President, the federal courts, or the states have the ultimate
power to declare that an amendment has been properly ratified.271 As it currently
stands, Coleman suggests that Congress has the power to determine whether a rati-
fication has in fact occurred,272 but prior practice suggests there have been anoma-
lies.273 The Fourteenth Amendment, for instance, was held to be valid despite two
state rescissions, which has led most scholars to argue that ratification is a one-way
street.274 And the Fourteenth and the Twenty-Seventh Amendments were both
promulgated before any congressional statement of acceptance.275
A congressional deadline has been held not to void a properly ratified amend-
ment, but the courts have not weighed in on the difference between deadlines in the
resolving clause or in the text, or whether an effective deadline would be unconstitu-
tional.276 There is a wide gap between the idea that there is an implicit statute of
limitations to void stale amendments when none are stated, and whether Congress
264 Paulsen, supra note 36, at 713.
265 See id. at 724–25.
266 See id. at 712, 714, 721.
267 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939).
268 See O.L.C. Memorandum, supra note 244, at 102–05; Paulsen, supra note 36, at 680.
269 Bernstein, supra note 256, at 542–43.
270 Id.
271 See id. at 539–41.
272 See id. at 544.
273 See O.L.C. Memorandum, supra note 244, at 104–05; Paulsen, supra note 36, at 680.
274 This is supported by Congressional opinion as well. In discussing the D.C. Representa-
tion Amendment, Representative Volkmer opined that after research on the subject he felt
that rescissions after ratification should not be allowed. 124 CONG. REC. 5270 (1978).
275 See O.L.C. Memorandum, supra note 244, at 104–05; Paulsen, supra note 36, at 680.
276 See Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921) (finding a Congressional deadline does
not void a ratified amendment).
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has the power to impose a statute of limitations on the states that have the exclusive
power to ratify amendment proposals.
Although Congress did pass a resolution accepting the Twenty-Seventh Amend-
ment, the general consensus is that acknowledging ratification is a ministerial act.277
And, if there is disagreement as to whether ratification has in fact occurred, the most
logical body to determine if the constitutional requirements of Article V have been met
would be the courts.278 There is some allure in the claim that Congress gets to determine
if a state has ratified, and that the decision is a political question, unreviewable by
a court.279 There is very little allure to the claim that the courts have no power to review
any questions involving the procedural steps of Article V.280 All of this uncertainty
leaves us, as noted above, in the unenviable position of trying to determine who should
decide, and within what parameters, whether the ERA has been validly ratified after
thirty-eight states submit their ratifications to the National Archivist.
Coleman and Dillon represent the Supreme Court’s total consideration of time
limits in amendment ratification, and neither is on point for the issues raised by the
ERA because the time limit is in the resolving clause.281 Moreover, the Eighteenth
Amendment being considered in Dillon passed,282 and the Child Labor Amendment
considered in Coleman never received the requisite ratifications.283 This means that
when the ERA reaches its thirty-eighth ratification, it will squarely pose, for the first
time, whether Congress can impose a time limit that in fact might nullify a proposal
fully ratified by the states pursuant to the technical requirements of Article V. In that
vein, the deadline in the ERA will truly be a case of first impression.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEADLINE
Because the constitutionality of the deadline will be a case of first impression,
the Court may consider the issue anew, since Dillon involved a different type of
deadline (in the text of the amendment itself and not the resolving clause) and the
Eighteenth Amendment was actually ratified within the time period, not afterward.284
At the time the ERA’s original seven-year deadline was reaching its end, Congress
277 See Bernstein, supra note 256, at 540–41.
278 For a thorough discussion of these three “details,” see Brendon Troy Ishikawa, Everything
You Always Wanted to Know About How Amendments are Made, but Were Afraid to Ask, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545, 546–49 (1997).
279 See id. at 548.
280 See id. at 591–95 (arguing that the courts are the best arbiter of Article V procedural
questions).
281 See Bernstein, supra note 256, at 543.
282 See Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921).
283 See Witter, supra note 34, at 210 n.13.
284 Compare H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972) (placing limitation in resolving
clause), with U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 3 (placing the limitation within the text of the amend-
ment (repealed in 1933)).
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debated extending the deadline and numerous scholars weighed in on the subject.285
Most of that scholarship accepted the constitutionality of a Congressional deadline
in light of Dillon,286 although it also noted the issue could be different if the deadline
was in the resolving clause.287 As a result, most also accepted the power of Congress
to extend the deadline in the resolving clause through a majority resolution.288 But
with ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment after 203 years,289 I think the
issue is worth a second or even a third look. In particular, the recognition that the
political, social, and economic conditions may persist, wane, or re-emerge at any
time in the future supports the conclusion that Congress may not impose any time
limit on an amendment proposal.290 This conclusion stems primarily from the fact
that the legally necessary and sufficient element of state ratification by the people
cannot be subjected to the whims or conditions of the national legislature. Before
turning to the multitude of reasons supporting this conclusion, we must first turn our
attention to the unprecedented passage of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.
A. The Political, Social, and Economic Conditions Called for a Revival of the
Congressional Pay Act Amendment
The Congressional Pay Act Amendment reads: “[N]o law, varying the compen-
sation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an
election of Representatives shall have intervened.”291
Proposed in 1789 as one of the original twelve amendments, the Pay Act Amend-
ment was not ratified until 1992.292 Its history is not without a colorful flair.293 In
1982, a University of Texas college student, Gregory Watson, wrote a term paper
arguing that the amendment was still alive and should be ratified.294 He purportedly
285 Some said Congress had the authority and others have claimed it did not. See Ginsburg,
supra note 19, at 926 n.40; Held et al., supra note 36, at 130–31; Comment, The Equal Rights
Amendment and Article V: A Framework for Analysis of the Extension and Rescission Issues,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 494, 517 (1978) [hereinafter The Equal Rights Amendment and Article V];
Witter, supra note 34, at 219–23. But see Orrin Hatch, The Equal Rights Amendment Extension:
A Critical Analysis, 2 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 19, 23–25 (1979); Grover Rees III, Throwing
Away the Key: The Unconstitutionality of the Equal Rights Amendment Extension, 58 TEX.
L. REV. 875, 879 (1980); Alexander White, Note, Keep ‘em Separated: Article I, Article V, and
Congress’s Limited and Defined Role in the Process of Amending the Constitution, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 1051, 1076–79 (2013).
286 See Hatch, supra note 285, at 22–23; Witter, supra note 34, at 212–13.
287 See Hatch, supra note 285, at 31; Witter, supra note 34, at 213.
288 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 928–29; NEALE, supra note 3, at 15.
289 See Bernstein, supra note 256, at 498.
290 See The Equal Rights Amendment and Article V, supra note 285, at 502–03.
291 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.
292 Bernstein, supra note 256, at 498.
293 See generally id. (discussing the ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment over
a 200 year period).
294 Paulsen, supra note 36, at 678.
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received a “C” on the paper, which allegedly motivated him to start a letter-writing
campaign to state legislators to revive the amendment.295 Frustration with Congres-
sional self-dealing in the form of “middle-of-the-night, rush-out-of-town pay raises
spurred a wave of state ratifications” during the 1980s.296 Congress’s check-bounc-
ing scandal and the Senate’s midnight pay raise of 1991 provided further impetus
and the amendment received its final state ratification in May, 1992.297 Eventually,
Watson’s grade was changed to an “A” after his efforts bore fruit.298
The last ratification caught nearly everyone off guard, as the Congressional Re-
search Service, the Office of Legal Counsel, and scores of academics weighed in on
the question of whether a proposal could linger for 203 years—precisely the fears
Justice VanDevanter expressed in Dillon.299 At the same time, however, the Congres-
sional shenanigans with last-minute pay raises gave the amendment more salience
and resonance as the states had become fed up with what had become the new
normal in Washington.300 In that sense, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment posed pre-
cisely the situation presaged by Justice Story in 1833 and Justice Hughes in 1939
that the political, social, and economic conditions may persist or reappear to justify
allowing a lengthy ratification period.301 In the end, the consensus was that the
amendment was legally ratified and it became the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.302
Although the Courts have not weighed in on its validity, which would likely only occur
if Congress were to pass a pay raise without an intervening election, it has stood
unquestioned now for nearly three decades as a properly ratified amendment.303
The history of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment poses an interesting question
for proponents of the ERA. Despite the deadline, can the states not take matters into
their own hands and ratify an extant proposal when they feel the political, social,
and economic conditions suggest that it is warranted? Is it Congress or the states that
should decide whether the political, social, or economic conditions are ripe for
change? The current situation of a misogynist president who has sexually assaulted
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in bringing down scores of powerful men accused of sexual assault,305 and the stag-
gering report that women make only $0.49 for every dollar made by men306 suggests
that the political, social, and economic conditions continue to be ripe for passage of the
ERA. And that fact seems precisely to be what has motivated Nevada and Illinois
to ratify the ERA a mere thirty-five years after it was proposed.307 Thus, the legal
question before the courts will be whether Congress may impose, in the resolving
clause, a deadline that will nullify a constitutional amendment that has received the
requisite state ratifications and continues to have political, social, and economic vi-
tality? And although the ERA does not raise the question of the constitutionality of a
deadline in the text,308 I would argue that any deadline is an unconstitutional in-
fringement of the states’ rights to exercise their Article V power to ratify amendments
without barriers being erected by the national legislature.
B. Reasoning by First Principles
There are a number of principles that support the conclusion that any Congres-
sional deadline is unconstitutional. Perhaps the most important is that the Constitution
was established by the people and the people, their wishes mediated through the state
legislatures, have the necessary and sufficient power to amend the Constitution.309
Any default gleaned from the silence of Article V would tend toward a limitation on
Congress’s authority as the Founders clearly intended numerous explicit and implicit
checks on the national legislature.310 Because the legal significance of the amend-
ment process is the state ratification, imposing limits on the states would seem to go
counter to the clear philosophy of the Constitution.311 Further, traditional canons of
.com/politics/trump-recorded-having-extremely-lewd-conversation-about-women-in-2005
/2016/10/07/3b9ce776-8cb4-11e6-bf8a-3d26847eeed4_story.html [https://perma.cc/J935-2EZ7].
305 See Christen A. Johnson & KT Hawbaker, #MeToo: A Timeline of Events, CHI. TRIB.
(May 2, 2019, 3:56 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyle/ct-me-too-timeline-20171
208-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/YK5R-6YCZ].
306 Rose & Hartmann, supra note 16.
307 See S.J. Res. 2, 79th Sess., at 2–3 (Nev. 2017), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS
/REL/79th2017/Bill/4912/Text [https://perma.cc/ELK9-88E7] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019)
(“The Legislature of the State of Nevada finds that the proposed amendment is meaningful
and needed as part of the Constitution of the United States and that the present political, social
and economic conditions demonstrate that constitutional equality for women and men continues
to be a timely issue in the United States”). Illinois State Senator Heather Steans stated that “[b]y
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construction suggest that the preamble, at the very least, is non-binding; only the
operative words of the amendment matter because that is only what is ratified by the
states.312 Even the omitted words canon suggests that the deadline is unconstitutional.313
And certainly, the original intent was to protect the power of the states against a na-
tional government that would be jealous of its power and would logically strive for
more, thwarting the states by throwing up roadblocks to change.314
1. Original Intent
As noted above, the two principal concerns of the Founders were to provide a
process to amend the Constitution when new experience and new circumstances
suggested change was required.315 Certainly the ERA fits that bill, as the struggle for
sex equality has taken centuries and will likely take many more years to achieve.316
Even basic legal and civil rights for women, sexual minorities, and transgender
persons have been elusive.317 Another concern was to protect the power of the states
to initiate amendments and to ensure state control of the ratification process.318 The
Virginia Plan proposed by Governor Edmund Randolph included a resolution “that
provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever
it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature ought not to
be required thereto.”319 Randolph echoed the fears of many at the convention that the
national legislature will be loathe to amend the Constitution when doing so would
limit federal power.320 The idea that the states were the key players in ratification,
and could initiate amendments on their own, flowed directly from the convention
itself as a meeting of the state representatives who represented the people directly.321
David Watson, in his treatise on the history of the Constitution, explained that
the Constitution does not prescribe the time in which the States
may ratify an amendment. Such a provision might have been
regarded as an attempt to force the States into a ratification,
312 See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 923–24.
313 See Paulsen, supra note 36, at 694 n.54.
314 See The Equal Rights Amendment and Article V, supra note 285, at 500–01.
315 See id.
316 Efforts to pass the ERA began in 1923. See SUSAN D. BECKER, THE ORIGINS OF THE
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: AMERICAN FEMINISM BETWEEN THE WARS 15, 19 (1981);
DELSMAN, supra note 28, at 29–32; see also Witter, supra note 34, at 209.
317 See generally LGBT Rights Milestones Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 1, 2019, 9:18 AM), https://
www.cnn.com/2015/06/19/US/lgbt-rights-milestones-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc
/4C9V-RC8T] (demonstrating the long history of the LGBT community’s fight for civil rights).
318 See The Equal Rights Amendment and Article V, supra note 285, at 501–02.
319 Henry, supra note 119, at 39.
320 See Greg Abbott, The Myths and Realities of Article V, 21 TEX. R.L. & POL. 1, 8–9 (2016).
321 See id. at 7.
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whereas it was the desire of the Convention that the action of the
States should be deliberate and free from influence.322
Further on this point, Watson showed his prescience:
[The Sixteenth A]mendment is now pending. Thirty-five States
must ratify it before it can become a part of the Constitution.
Suppose thirty-four States should ratify it within a reasonable
time but the thirty-fifth should not do so until the expiration of ten
or fifteen years? Would this be a ratification within the meaning
of the Constitution? Can the doctrine of reasonable time be applied
in such a case? Who but the State can judge of what would be a
reasonable time? It is for the State to ratify and cannot the State
take its own time to do it? What branch of the government can
tell a State when it must ratify an amendment in the absence of
any constitutional provision of the subject? The question may
some day become of great importance.323
As Watson noted, the question of a time limit on ratification was not considered by
the Constitutional Convention nor by any of the state conventions called to consider
ratification of the Constitution.324 However, given the efficacious role of the states
in ratifying amendments, and the Founders’ clear and unwavering intent to limit
Congress’s ability to thwart amendments sought by the states, the logical interpreta-
tion is that Congress cannot put a time limit on the ratification process.325 If states
choose to ratify ten, fifteen, thirty-five, or two hundred and two years later, that pre-
rogative lies solely with the states.326
None other than the renowned Justice Story noted that constitutional amendments
may take time to achieve consensus among the states and therefore should not be
rushed.327 He noted that “[t]ime is thus allowed, and ample time, for deliberation, both
in proposing and ratifying amendments. They cannot be carried by surprise, or intrigue,
or artifice. Indeed, years may elapse before a deliberate judgment may be passed upon
them, unless some pressing emergency calls for instant action.”328 He also noted that:
Whenever, then, a general power exists, or is granted to a gov-
ernment, which may in its actual exercise or abuse be dangerous
322 WATSON, supra note 87, at 1310–11.
323 Id. at 1311–12.
324 Id. at 1310–11.
325 See Abbott, supra note 320, at 7.
326 See WATSON, supra note 87, at 1310–11.
327 See STORY, supra note 64, § 1824.
328 Id.
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to the people, there seems a peculiar propriety in restricting its
operations, and in excepting from it some at least of the most
mischievous forms, in which it may be likely to be abused.329
Story, in explaining and justifying the constitution, recognized that amendments
take time and should be thoughtfully proposed and carefully ratified.330 He also noted
that powers in the government should be narrowly construed when implied powers
tend to infringe individual rights.331 In the case of the deadline, the Tenth Amendment’s
protections against federal usurpation of power speaks both to the states’ rights to con-
trol the amendment process and the individual’s rights to express their wishes through
their states rather than through the indirect voice of their national legislature.332
Studies have also shown that it is Congress and not the states that put up the
greatest barriers to the amendment process.333 In the 130 years between the founding
and 1924, over 3,500 amendments have been proposed but only nineteen adopted.334
Most constitutional amendment proposals wither and die in Congressional commit-
tees year after year, and the ERA is no exception.335 Having first been proposed in
1923, it took fifty years for it to reach the floor of each house of Congress, and even
then the proponents had to use a procedural rule to remove the resolution from com-
mittee and bring it to the floor of the House for a vote.336 And the success rate of
most proposals once they reach the states supports the conclusion that it is Congress,
and not the states, that imposes the roadblock.337 Consequently, working from a
clean slate with little to guide us, the logical interpretation is that Congress should
not throw up any additional roadblocks once the proposal passes the necessary two-
thirds votes of both houses.338 That alone has proven to be a significant barrier.339
329 STORY, supra note 64, § 1858.
330 See id. § 1824.
331 See id. § 1858.
332 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
333 See Herman V. Ames, The Amending Provision of the Federal Constitution in Practice,
63 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y. 62, 64 (1924).
334 Id. at 63
335 See id.
336 Proponents of the ERA used the procedure pursuant to clause 4 of Rule 27, House
Rules, 91st Congress that allows for the full body to vote a motion to discharge a House com-
mittee from further consideration of a bill. It had only been used two other times before its use
to discharge the committee from further consideration of the ERA and to allow its passage
to the floor. See Witter, supra note 34, at 215 & n.74.
337 Only six of thirty-three proposals have failed to receive the requisite number of state
ratifications. With the ERA being ratified, that brings the success rate to 85% at the state
level. See Trex, supra note 24.
338 Scholars tend to agree. See Hajdu & Rosenblum, supra note 63, at 128 (“From the per-
spective of the states, however, the unrestrained power of subsequent Congresses to assess
the reasonableness of time limits poses serious problems.”).
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This interpretation is further supported by the clear textual command that the
amendment becomes legally effective upon ratification.340 The Supreme Court has
held that the president’s signature is not required on the joint resolution,341 that Con-
gress does not need to affirm or legitimate an amendment once the requisite states
have ratified,342 that states may not impose additional barriers and requirements like
public referenda or the interposition of an election,343 and the Tenth Amendment
further supports the conclusion that the states have the ultimate legal power to bring
an amendment to fruition.344 Although the Constitution contemplates a role for Con-
gress in the proposal, that process was added only after the provisions allowing for
state initiation of amendments, as Governor Morris and others felt the national govern-
ment would likely be the first to recognize defects in its organic document.345 By
providing a means for each to initiate the amendment process, the Founders provided
a balance, but the requirement of state ratification means that amendments would be
made only if a supermajority of the states, representing their people, willed the
change.346 In essence, therefore, the states are both necessary and sufficient to the
amendment process, and the possibility that Congress will use its mode-of-ratification
power to thwart the wishes of the states seems counter to that most basic of premises.347
2. Changing Political, Social, and Economic Conditions
The idea that amendments become stale or that states should not be surprised by
a sudden ratification years, decades, or even centuries later has an immediate appeal.
But upon further consideration, the flaw in that position becomes clear. If the legally
necessary act is state ratification, and barriers should not be thrown up by the
national legislature when the states determine changes are appropriate, should it not
be on the states rather than Congress to determine whether the political, social, and
economic conditions are ripe for an amendment? As David Watson queried, what
340 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
341 See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 378, 381 (1798).
342 According to the Department of Justice, there is no requirement of congressional approval.
See O.L.C. Memorandum, supra note 244, at 99.
343 See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922) (invalidating a state law requiring inter-
position of an election for Congress between proposal and ratification); Hawke v. Smith, 253
U.S. 221, 231 (1920) (invalidating a state law requiring a public referendum of a state legis-
lature’s ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment).
344 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
345 Amendment was a purely state function until August 30, 1787, when Governor Morris
suggested that Congress should also be able to call a convention for amendments, and the
strength of the states’ only position led to rejection of Morris’s suggestion the first time it was
voted on. See Abbott, supra note 320, at 10–11. Hamilton ultimately suggested the process
to allow Congress to make proposals. Id. at 11.
346 Id. at 10–11.
347 See id. at 12–13.
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government can tell the states when, how, or if they should ratify?348 The ratification
of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment strongly supports the conclusion that determin-
ing when the political, social, and economic conditions call for an amendment is
solely the province of the states, even if it takes over two centuries.349
This does not mean that Congress is powerless to act. In the case of the ERA,
since Congress imposed the time limit in the resolving clause there is no reason why
Congress would not be able to remove it or waive it if the states, through their recent
ratifications, indicate a determination to effectuate the amendment.350 This is true
only because the deadline in the ERA is in the resolving clause, which is a piece of
ordinary legislation that can be amended by future Congresses.351 The matter might
be different if the deadline was in the text of the amendment itself. Based on my
argument above, it would not matter where the deadline was located, one would always
be unconstitutional. If, as with the Eighteenth Amendment, the deadline was in the
text of the amendment,352 it would simply be severed as void, leaving the substantive
part of the amendment valid under ordinary severability rules.353 But even if a court
were to adhere to the decision in Dillon that Congress may incorporate a time limit
in the text of an amendment, presumably as part of its proposing power, there is no
reason that a time limit in the resolving clause could not be waived or amended.354
But what if Congress refused to waive the deadline, and the states brought suit
to validate their ratification, claiming the deadline was unconstitutional on its face?
Such a showdown would likely require resolution by the courts, and the holding in
Coleman suggests that state legislators would have standing to pursue a judicial
remedy.355 The determination whether a state had actually ratified after rejection, or
presumably rescinded after ratification might be deemed a political question left to
Congress.356 But the imposition of the deadline is clearly a different matter and
would not, under normal political question jurisprudence, remove the case from the
courts.357 It would seem that if the states brought suit to validate their ratification of
348 See WATSON, supra note 87, at 1311–12.
349 Held et al., supra note 36, at 121–22, 125.
350 Minnesota House Resolution 71 was proposed January 14, 2019, to call on the Congress
of the United States to enact Senate Joint Resolution 15 or House Joint Resolution 113, proposed
at the 113th Congress of the United States, or similar legislation, to remove the deadline for rati-
fication of the Equal Rights Amendments by the states claiming that equality could not wait
another 200 years. See H.R. 71, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2019).
351 Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s argument that the text of the resolving clause is simply ordinary
legislation is compelling. See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 928–30 (explaining that Congress
could have used a two-step process to create the proposal, requiring a simple majority for the
preamble, and a supermajority for the text of the proposal itself).
352 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 3.
353 See 55 CONG. REC. 5652–53 (1917).
354 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 371, 374 (1921).
355 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438–46 (1939).
356 Id. at 450–54.
357 Id. at 438.
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the ERA, that would itself be proof that the issue was not stale and the amendment
retained its vitality.358
3. Seven Years Is Too Short
The Court in Dillon held that seven years was a reasonable time limit in light of
the fact that no prior amendment had taken longer than four years for ratification,359
and most of those were in a time before the internet, telephones, and some even before
the pony express. Again, there is an appeal to this idea, that amendments should be
ratified within a timely manner, as the political and social conditions are ripe.360 On
the other hand, considering the profound gerrymandering of states in the past thirty
years, it is quite likely that it would take well over a decade for a heavily gerryman-
dered state to right itself and elect representatives who represent the will of the
majority.361 The repeal of Prohibition in 1933 revealed just how much state legisla-
tures of the day did not reflect the general will of the people.362
Seven years seems like a long time, but when we consider election cycles, and
the ability of legislators to use procedural mechanisms to block bills they do not favor
for years at a time, seven years suddenly does not seem like such a long time.363 During
a debate on the Twentieth Amendment, Representative Frear introduced a chart
showing how often each state’s legislature meets in an effort to defeat the seven-year
deadline.364 He argued that in some states whose legislatures only meet every four
years, a seven-year deadline would essentially preclude consideration or ensure that
consideration was likely to be hasty and ad hoc.365
The fact that all amendments so far have passed in fewer than five years, except
for the Twenty-Seventh, is not an answer to those Congressmen who seek finality.366
The fact that James Madison rejected the idea of conditional ratifications supports the
straightforward interpretation of Article V that Congress may not impose limits on
the states, because they are the operative agents in constitutional change.367 Because
358 Id. at 451–54.
359 Dillon, 256 U.S. at 375–76.
360 Id. at 371, 374.
361 See Vann R. Newkirk II, How Redistricting Became a Technological Arms Race, ATLAN-
TIC (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/gerrymandering
-technology-redmap-2020/543888/ [https://perma.cc/BKS2-AEC2].
362 See Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 177, at 624.
363 See 75 CONG. REC. 3835 (1932).
364 Id.
365 Id.; see also Kalfus, supra note 36, at 453–54 (admitting that time limits allow Congress
to use short time limits to reap political gains but essentially kill a proposal by making the limit
too short).
366 Ron Elving, The Zombie Amendments to the Constitution You’ve Probably Never Heard
of, NPR (Mar. 10, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/10/591758259/the-zombie-amend
ments-to-the-constitution-youve-probably-never-heard-of [https://perma.cc/53XA -3W3D].
367 See WATSON, supra note 87, at 1317.
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their actions determine whether an amendment passes or not, states should be the enti-
ties to determine whether the appropriate political, social, or economic conditions mili-
tate in favor of a constitutional change and limits on their powers should be resisted.368
4. Limitations in a Preamble Are Generally Not Binding
The poster boy of originalism, Justice Antonin Scalia, in his opinion on the Second
Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller, stated that preambles are not binding.369
Only the operative part of the Second Amendment was given constitutional signifi-
cance as Justice Scalia waived away the preamble as a limitation.370 The same can
be said of the deadline in the resolving clause.371 Preambles usually provide informa-
tion about why a law is passed. They may provide for certain remedies, but, they
usually do not articulate the limits of the law.372 Courts often ignore preambles to
legislation in interpreting the scope of statutes.373 For that reason, many scholars and
Congressmen believed that the deadline in the ERA could be extended back in
1979.374 It was seen to be fundamentally different from the proposal itself.375
Beyond that, however, we must consider the different functions of the proposal
power and the mode of ratification power. The proposal power consists of the power
to identify the need for constitutional change and articulate the text of the amend-
ment.376 Imposing a deadline for ratification is fundamentally at odds with identifying
the constitutional problem to be solved and the textual amendment designed to solve
it.377 Proposing amendments logically means identifying the substance of the consti-
tutional change and proposing that change to the states.378 Including a deadline
within that proposal has no relation to the substance of the proposal itself.379 Certain
amendments, like the ERA, have time limitations in the proposal but those are
designed to identify when the amendment will become effective, in order to give
368 Id.
369 554 U.S. 570, 578 (2008).
370 Justice Scalia opined that “apart from that clarifying function, a prefatory clause does
not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.” Id.
371 H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. (1972).
372 Justice Scalia cited for this purpose the following: FORTUNATS DWARRIS, A GENERAL
TREATISE ON STATUTES 268–69 (Platt Potter ed., 1871); THEODORE SEDGWICK, THE INTER-
PRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 42–45 (2d ed.
1874). “It is nothing unusual . . . for the enacting part to go beyond the preamble; the remedy
often extends beyond the particular act or mischief which first suggested the necessity of the
law.” JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION
§ 51 (1882) (quoting Rex v. Marks, 3 East 157, 165 (1802)).
373 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 578.
374 See Witter, supra note 34, at 219.
375 Id. at 220.
376 Id.
377 See Kalfus, supra note 36, at 452–53.
378 Id. at 454–56.
379 See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 923.
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states time to modify their laws in compliance.380 The Twentieth Amendment identifies
when it will become operative, not whether it will become operative.381 Section 3 of
the ERA notes that it will become effective two years after ratification.382 Both of
these time constraints function to determine how the amendment will proceed once
it is ratified.383 They are fundamentally different from a time limit on ratification,
which highlights the differences between the proposal power and the mode of
ratification power.
The deadline for ratification most logically falls within the mode of ratification
power, yet Congress only has four express alternatives under the Constitution for
identifying the mode of ratification.384 Calling the deadline a matter of detail,
moreover, implies that it is a mere procedural technicality and not a substantive
limit.385 Deadlines in the text seem completely inconsistent with a determination of
the mode of ratification.386 Deadlines in the preamble, on the other hand, seem com-
pletely ineffective. Understanding the two powers, and their differences, helps us to
see exactly why deadlines are unconstitutional.387 They do not address or resolve the
constitutional provision being amended pursuant to the proposal power, and they are
too limiting to be a mere detail under the mode of ratification.388
Besides the doctrine that preambles are generally not binding, Justice Scalia also
spent many of his professional years articulating a series of canons of construction
that argue against interpreting the silence on the part of Article V as including the
power to impose a ratification deadline.389 The omitted-case canon holds that “[n]othing
is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies (causus omissus pro omisso
habendus est). That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered.”390 As
R.W.M. Dias explains, “A judge may not add words that are not in the statute, save
only by way of necessary implication.”391 Unless there is a necessary implication that
Congress’s mode of ratification power includes the power to impose a deadline on
the states, the omitted-case canon suggests that courts should not imply the power.392
In teaching Constitutional Law, I often ask my students to identify the text of the
Constitution at issue in a particular case. Then I ask if the text provides an explicit
380 See H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. § 3 (1972); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.
381 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 5.
382 H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. § 3 (1972).
383 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 5; H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. § 3 (1972).
384 See Kalfus, supra note 36, at 438.
385 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921).
386 See Held et al., supra note 36, at 114.
387 See Kalfus, supra note 36, at 451–52.
388 Id. at 452–53.
389 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 93 (2012).
390 Id.
391 4 R.W.M. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 232 (4th ed. 1976).
392 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 389, at 93.
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answer. The response is virtually always no; the text is silent. I then ask what the proper
procedure should be for resolving the conflict when the constitutional text is silent.
We then talk about original intent, logic, current need, past precedent, constitutional
reason, and the proper weighing of these factors. There is no clear right or wrong
answer to most of these questions, simply a process of reasoning through multiple
factors, evidence, and consequences. The deadline issue is similar to the hundreds
of other situations in which the Supreme Court has had to resolve a conflict arising
from textual silence.393 In this case, however, I think the issue is relatively easy to
resolve because the default rule of states’ rights, limited federal power, and logic all
support the conclusion that ratification deadlines, of any sort, are unconstitutional
limits on the states’ power of ratification.394
We can also learn something from the Court’s 1926 decision in Myers v. United
States regarding the removal power.395 In that case, the President sought to remove
an officer who had been nominated by a prior President and approved with the
advice and consent of the Senate.396 In determining which body, the President or the
Senate, had the power to act on an issue for which the Constitution was silent, the Court
held that the power lay with the President because “[t]he power of removal is inci-
dent to the power of appointment, not to the power of advising and consenting to
appointment . . . .”397 In similar fashion, Article V shares the amendment power be-
tween the states and Congress,398 but it seems clear to me that the power to determine
when an amendment should be considered ratified is incident to the ratification power,
not the proposal power.
5. Arguments for Constitutionality
There are two basic arguments for the constitutionality of the deadline. The first
is that the text is silent and that Congress’s express power to prescribe the mode of
ratification logically includes implied powers to express the details.399 Of course,
one would question whether a deadline in the case of the ERA is a mere detail, but
more about that later. Second, Dillon expressly states that Congress may impose
reasonable time limits, without limiting its holding to deadlines within the text of
the amendment itself.400 But do either of these withstand the force of the arguments
to the contrary? When the ERA was originally proposed, there was much discussion
about the addition of the deadline.401 Senator Birch Bayh indicated that it was just
393 See Kalfus, supra note 36, at 463.
394 See discussion supra Sections II.B.1–4.
395 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
396 Id. at 106.
397 Id. at 1–22.
398 U.S. CONST. art. V.
399 See Held et al., supra note 36, at 114–15.
400 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375–76.
401 116 CONG. REC. 36863 (1970).
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a technicality, a procedural detail that all prior amendments had included.402 Propo-
nents of the ERA accepted the addition, despite the fact that the Nineteenth Amendment
on women’s suffrage had not included a time limit, and it was felt that the issues of
equality and individual rights were similar enough that the ERA should not be sub-
ject to one either.403 On the other hand, others felt that since no amendment had taken
longer than four years to be ratified, the seven-year deadline was innocuous enough.404
With 20/20 hindsight, proponents later realized their complacence was misplaced.405
But the deadline was a moot point since thirty-eight states had not ratified.406 How-
ever, we are in a very different position in 2019 than we were in 1972. With passage
of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, the question of political and social viability raises
profound concerns about the deadline.407 With an understanding of the Founders’ fears
about Congress frustrating the will of the states, and the recognition that political
and social salience may remain for far more than ten or fifteen years, the better in-
terpretation of the text’s silence is that the power does not lie with Congress.408
As for Dillon v. Gloss, that case can be distinguished since it concerned a dead-
line in the text.409 It can also be read for what it actually stood for, that an amendment
with a deadline that was in fact ratified fully within the time period was not rendered
void simply because of the surplus verbiage of a deadline.410 Dillon says nothing
about the validity of a deadline that would have the operative effect of defeating an
amendment that was otherwise properly ratified by all the requisite states, a situation
that has never yet arisen.411
It is notable that some senators viewed the power to impose a deadline as a part
of the necessary-and-proper power of Congress to effectuate the mandate granted to it
by the Constitution.412 Because Congress has the power to dictate the mode of rati-
fication, so the argument goes, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives it the power to
dictate the details and the means to effectuate its Article V powers.413 But one must ask
whether a deadline is either necessary or proper. Even given the Court’s generous
402 Witter, supra note 34, at 216; see also 116 CONG. REC. 36863 (1970) (Bayh’s amend-
ment added the time limit to the joint resolution which ultimately failed, but all successive
resolutions then contained the deadline).
403 Witter, supra note 34, at 215–16.
404 Representative Martha Griffiths, a critical proponent of the ERA, accepted the seven-
year deadline so that it would “not be hanging over [their] head[s] forever.” 117 CONG. REC.
35815 (1971) (statement of Rep. Griffiths). However, she incorrectly thought the momentum was
such that it would pass quickly. Id. at 35814–15; see also Witter, supra note 34, at 215–16.
405 See 117 CONG. REC. 35814–15 (1971).
406 See Witter, supra note 34, at 210.
407 See Held et. al., supra note 36, at 121–23.
408 See discussion supra Sections II.B.1–4.
409 256 U.S. 368, 376–77.
410 Id. at 374–75.
411 Id.
412 See 56 CONG. REC. 445 (1917) (statement of Rep. Steele).
413 See id.
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reading of necessary as “convenient,”414 there is no reason why Congress needs to
impose a deadline at all. Unlike chartering a national bank in order to manage reve-
nues and pay debts and expenses, imposing a deadline serves no federal purpose.
And the Necessary and Proper Clause is located in Article I, not Article V, which
may also limit its reach.415
Arguably, once Congress makes the decision to propose an amendment, all
power is out of its hands as the matter proceeds to the states.416 A deadline operates
like a take-back, neither of which is arguably available under the text or an ordinary
reading of Article V.417 There is nothing necessary or proper about a take-back. Al-
though typical legislation can be rescinded, and one congress generally cannot bind
future congresses, the amendment procedure is unique in that regard.418 Because
states arguably cannot rescind their ratifications, it would seem that the proposal
power under Article V is also a one-way street.419 Rescission is a matter better left to
another article, but the general consensus is that states that initially reject a proposal
may later ratify, while states that ratify may not later rescind, for Article V speaks only
of state ratification.420
The argument that silence means Congress has the power to limit the states in
the amendment process goes against the history and theory of the founding.421 It also
gives Congress the power to propose a limited or conditional amendment, one that
includes within itself an acceptance of a limitation on the states.422 That philosophi-
cal conundrum, of itself, should be enough to argue against a broad reading of the
414 Justice Marshall gives a broad discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause in
McCulloch v. Maryland: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitu-
tion, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”
17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819); see also Hajdu & Rosenblum, supra note 63, at 134–35.
415 See Hajdu & Rosenblum supra note 63, at 139. Compare U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18,
with U.S. CONST. art. V.
416 See Leo Kanowitz & Marilyn Klinger, Can a State Rescind Its Equal Rights Amendment
Ratification: Who Decides and How? 28 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 981–82, 1000 (1977).
417 See U.S. CONST. art. V; Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 921 n.7, 939.
418 See Kanowitz & Klinger, supra note 416, at 983, 1002.
419 Numerous scholars have addressed the issue of rescission, which is likely to be the next
issue before the Court when the ERA deadline issue is resolved. Most see rescissions as im-
permissible. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 256, at 548; Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 939–42;
Hajdu & Rosenblum, supra note 63, at 120–22; Heckman, Ratification of a Constitutional
Amendment: Can a State Change Its Mind?, 6 CONN. L. REV. 28 (1973); Kanowitz & Klinger,
supra note 416, at 981. It is notable that both houses rejected amendments to the extension
of the ERA that would have allowed states to rescind. See 124 CONG. REC. 26227, 26236,
33222, 33354 (1978).
420 See U.S. CONST. art. V; 124 CONG. REC. 33168 (1978); Ginsburg, supra note 19, at
940–41, 940 n.127.
421 See 124 CONG. REC. 33168 (1978).
422 See id. at 33174, 33227.
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constitutional silence.423 Despite the appeal of the argument that the greater power
includes the lesser power, that argument does not work in this context. By limiting
the time within which the states can exercise their ratification function, Congress is
asserting a greater power, not a lesser one.424 And since power in this context is a
zero-sum game, more power in Congress to impose deadlines means less power in
the states to ratify when they feel it is appropriate.425
The argument from Dillon also does not hold much sway. The question in Dillon
was a narrow one of whether the entire amendment was void because of the deadline.426
The dicta that time limits are permissible and reasonable are just that: dicta.427 And
the Dillon situation involved a time limit within the text, not in the preamble.428 There
is plenty of Supreme Court precedent that the preamble should not be given weight
over the operative language in constitutional interpretation.429 Justice Scalia’s lengthy
analysis of the text and history of the Second Amendment, in District of Columbia
v. Heller, and his rejection of the preamble as a limitation on the operative language
of the second part of the right, supports a narrow reading of constitutional powers
in line with federalism principles.430
III. IMPLICATIONS OF HOLDING THE DEADLINE TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The most obvious implication of holding the deadline to be unconstitutional is
that the ERA would likely become effective.431 I suppose one cannot be too critical
of that outcome if the requisite thirty-eight states in fact have ratified the amend-
ment.432 It would be worse if the states all wanted the ERA and the Court held it to
be invalid because of a congressional time limitation. Striking the deadline would
be a case of allowing majority will to prevail and not of allowing a minority or a
procedural technicality to frustrate the will of the majority.
Perhaps of more concern are the other five amendments lurking out there which
might be ratified by state legislatures at some point in the future.433 Of course, the ex-
ample of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment does not seem to have caused the govern-
ment to melt down, and it is unlikely that adoption of either the Titles of Nobility
423 See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 926 n.40.
424 See Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 375, 379 (1920).
425 See id.
426 See id. at 369, 375–76.
427 See Kalfus, supra note 36, at 446–47.
428 See NEALE, supra note 3, at Summary; Kalfus, supra note 36, at 438 & n.7.
429 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 25 S. Ct. 358, 359–60 (1906).
430 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 578, 610 (2008).
431 See NEALE, supra note 3, at 1.
432 See id.
433 See Constitutional Amendments That Have Failed, LEXISNEXIS, https://lexisnexis.com
/constitution/amendments_failed.asp [https://perma.cc/W2F6-SF6L] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
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(proposed in 1810)434 or the House Apportionment (proposed in 1789) amendments
would throw our government into chaos.435 The Titles of Nobility Amendment revokes
citizenship for people accepting titles of nobility from a foreign sovereign, which
happens quite rarely.436 George H.W. Bush was made a Knight Grand Cross of the
Most Honorable Order of the Bath by Queen Elizabeth, but it is not a common event
these days.437 The Apportionment Amendment, the last of the initial twelve proposed
by Madison, is essentially obsolete.438 If it were ratified, the House of Representatives
could expand to over 6,000 members and that might require some new office build-
ings.439 The Child Labor Amendment (proposed in 1924) prohibits child labor,440 but
that is already prohibited by statute and Supreme Court precedent.441 These three
amendments do not have deadlines imposed by Congress and thus, hypothetically,
could be revived, but it seems unlikely that states would bother.442 And if they were, the
effects would be of little moment.
The D.C. Representation Amendment was proposed with a deadline.443 Assum-
ing the Court were to strike the deadline as unconstitutional, it could also be revived.444
However, giving representation to the District also would not throw the country into
chaos. It is likely that this is the only extant amendment for which there would be
434 See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1810).
435 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 773 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1836).
436 See Gideon M. Hart, The “Original” Thirteenth Amendment: The Misunderstood Titles
of Nobility Amendment, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 311, 316 (2010).
437 Nadine Brozan, Chronicle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1993, at B5.
438 It provided that there shall be one representative for every 30,000 people until the number
of representatives shall reach 100, after which the proportion shall be regulated by Congress.
There shall never be fewer than 100 representatives, nor less than one for every 40,000 persons
until the number shall reach 200, after which the proportion shall be regulated by Congress so
long as there shall not be fewer than 200 representatives nor more than one per every 50,000
persons. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 773 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1839). Since today Congress has
capped the number of representatives at 435, and each represents roughly 700,000 persons,
the Apportionment amendment is essentially being followed. See Permanent Apportionment Act,
2 U.S.C. § 2a (2012); Peter Baker, Expand the House?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2009), https://
www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/us/politics/18baker.html [https://perma.cc/34RB-LQUX].
There is not more than one representative for every 40,000 persons and there are more than
200 representatives. See Debate the Constitution: More House Members?, NAT’L CONST. CTR.
(Apr. 28, 2016), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/debate-the-constitution-more-house-members
[https://perma.cc/FR98-QPSR].
439 See Celmons v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 710 F. Supp. 2d 570, 580 (N.D. Miss. 2010).
440 See 65 CONG. REC. 7251 (1924).
441 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
442 See Hearing on the Equal Rights Amendment Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th
Cong. 4 (2019) (statement of Elizabeth Price Foley, Professor of Law, Florida International
University College of Law).
443 See NEALE, supra note 3, at 29.
444 See HOUSE RESEARCH DEP’T, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS:
MINNESOTA’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 26 (2016).
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any interest, but at this point only sixteen states have ratified it.445 If it were to pass,
however, the effect would also be relatively narrow.
The fifth extant amendment, however, the Corwin Amendment (proposed in
1861) would prohibit constitutional amendments abolishing or interfering with
slavery.446 It was proposed without a deadline and could presumably rear its ugly
head.447 However, only two states have currently ratified it,448 it has been essentially
negated by passage of the Thirteenth Amendment,449 and I would hope that any ef-
fort to reimpose slavery would not be accepted. Furthermore, there is something
fundamentally unacceptable about using the Article V amendment process to pass
an amendment that provides that no further amendments could be enacted on a
subject.450 Such a limitation would likely be stricken by the Court as irreconcilable
with Article V.451
The fact that the D.C. Representation Amendment might be revived, and the ERA
might become effective if the deadline were held to be unconstitutional are certainly
not reasons to fear such a result. Only the Corwin Amendment should give one
pause.452 But there are other ways to deal with that amendment. Possibly, Congress
could withdraw it if it appeared likely to rise like a phoenix from its ashes.453 More
importantly, passage of the ERA would have significant impact, which is precisely why
the amendment is still alive, being considered at the state levels, and receiving the re-
cent ratifications it has received.454 The political, social, and economic conditions favor
its passage, and that is not a reason to fear but rather to celebrate its accomplishment.455
In the future, however, Congress would not be able to impose deadlines if the
Court were to find the ERA deadline unconstitutional. Would that be so bad? For
a century and a half, Congress did not impose deadlines and the country did not
collapse, nor did the government run amok.456 It is hard to see what irreparable
problems might arise from nullifying Congress’s power to impose time limits. Most
likely, Congress will propose fewer amendments so it does not put the country
445 See NEALE, supra note 3, at 30.
446 See CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1283 (1861).
447 See id.
448 See UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, supra note 444, at 23.
449 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
450 See Philip L. Martin, Illinois’ Ratification of the Corwin Amendment, 15 J. PUB. L. 187,
189 (1966).
451 See U.S. CONST. art. V; Martin, supra note 450, at 191.
452 See A. Christopher Bryant, Stopping Time: The Pro-Slavery and “Irrevocable” Thir-
teenth Amendment, 26 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y. 501, 536 (2003).
453 See Frank E. Packard, Constitutional Law: The States and the Amending Process, 45
A.B.A.J. 161, 161 (1959).
454 See Bridget L. Murphy, Note, The Equal Rights Amendment Revisited, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 937, 938–39 (2018).
455 See id. at 944–45.
456 See NEALE, supra note 3, at 1.
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through another experiment like Prohibition.457 But Congress’s willingness to propose
amendments may also depend in large part on whether Congress can recall proposals
if it felt that the political, social, and economic conditions required withdrawal.458
Assuming that Congress possessed such power, which is admittedly another as-
sumption for which there also is no guiding precedent, the deadline issue would not
raise such profound implications.459
CONCLUSION
Whether the deadline in the ERA is deemed to be constitutional or not, the stakes
are high and the battle is likely to be fierce.460 Although few are likely to argue ex-
pressly that men and women should not be treated as legal equals, opposition to the
ERA will take many forms.461 Technical and procedural hurdles are always the first
resort of those hoping to thwart change.462 The congressional deadline is precisely
the kind of procedural detail that opponents will use to bolster their argument that the
ERA is a dead letter.463 And if the legislatures of the states agreed that the ERA was
dead, they would not have continued to ratify it nearly five decades after it was
initially proposed.464 The actions of those states are setting up a Tenth Amendment
challenge between the states and Congress as to who controls when and if constitu-
tional amendments will become operative.465
Based on the Founders’ philosophy of a limited federal government,466 the in-
clusion of the Tenth Amendment providing that powers not expressly granted to the
national government are reserved to the states and the people,467 and the silence of
Article V on the issue of deadlines,468 I argue that Congress has exceeded its power
by imposing any deadlines on state ratifications of constitutional amendments. This
view is further supported by constitutional philosophy469 and the grave concerns of
457 See id. at 26.
458 See Packard, supra note 453, at 161.
459 See Arthur Earl Bonfield, Proposing Constitutional Amendment by Convention: Some
Problems, 39 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 659, 667 (1966).
460 See Julie C. Suk, An Equal Rights Amendment for the Twenty-First Century: Bringing
Global Constitutionalism Home, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 381, 384–85 (2017).
461 See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitu-
tional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1324, 1337, 1402 (2006).
462 See supra notes 143–49 and accompanying text.
463 See NEALE, supra note 3, at Summary.
464 See id.
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many of the Congressmen who opposed the imposition of deadlines in numerous
twentieth-century proposals.470 It is possible, however, that Congress may choose
to waive or extend the deadline once the thirty-eighth state has ratified, perhaps mooting
the question of the constitutionality of the deadline and thus avoiding a judicial
determination that may limit its control over the mode of ratifications.471 Such a
move may be preferable to a constitutional showdown. But as the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment has illustrated, states do take seriously their only real leverage to control
the reach of the federal government.472 How ironic it would be for the states to en-
force their sovereign control over the national government through an equality amend-
ment that limits both federal and state power in the name of individual rights.
Although I cannot predict the final outcome, I can most assuredly predict that it will
be an interesting ride.
470 See NEALE, supra note 3, at 2–5.
471 See id. Summary.
472 See id. at 17.
